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Abstract
Due to the tremendous advancement in the semiconductor and microelectronics technolo-
gies, wireless technologies have blossomed in the recent decades. The large scale deployment
of wireless networks have revolutionized the way people live. They bring a great deal of
convenience and enjoyment to us. Undoubtedly, we have become more and more dependen-
t on these wireless technologies. These include cellular and radio frequency identification
(RFID) technologies. However, with great technologies also come great risks and threats.
Unlike wired transmissions, the nature of wireless transmissions result in the transmitted
signals over the channel can be easily intercepted and eavesdropped by malicious adver-
saries. Therefore, security and privacy of the employed wireless communication system are
easily compromised compared to the wired communication system. Consequently, secur-
ing wireless network has attracted a lot of attention in the recent years and it has huge
practical implications.
Securing wireless networks can be and indeed are performed at all layers of a network
protocol stack. These include application, network, data link and physical (PHY) layers.
The primary focus of our research is on the PHY layer approaches for securing and attacking
wireless networks. In this thesis, we identify three research topics and present our results.
They are: 1) PHY layer phase encryption (P-Enc) vs XOR encryption (XOR-Enc); 2)
PHY layer signaling scheme to ensure the confidentiality of the transmitted messages from
the tag to the reader in RFID systems. 3) Active eavesdropping attack framework under
frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) RFID systems.
In the first work, we introduce a new OFDM encryption scheme which we call OFDM-
Enc, different from convectional XOR-Enc, OFDM-Enc encrypts data by multiplying each
of in-phase and quadrature component of the time domain OFDM symbol by a keystream
bit. We then perform an initial investigation on the security of OFDM-Enc. We show
it is secure against all attacks that are considered in this work. Moreover, depending on
the modulation type, OFDM would potentially reduce the keystream size required for en-
cryption, while still achieving the required security level. We also conduct simulations to
compare OFDM-Enc with conventional XOR-Enc. We show indeed OFDM-Enc is viable
and can achieve good performances. Then we extend OFDM-Enc to general communica-
tion systems. Since the encryption is essentially done by changing the phase of the data
constellations, we just adopt the term P-Enc. In addition, we form mathematical formula-
tions in order to compare between P-Enc and XOR-Enc in terms of efficiency, security and
hardware complexity. Furthermore, we show P-Enc at the PHY layer can prevent traf-
fic analysis attack, which cannot be prevented with the upper layer encryptions. Finally,
simulations are conducted again to compare the performance of P-Enc and XOR-Enc.
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In the second work, we are interested in protecting tag’s data from leaking or being
compromised to malicious adversaries. As discussed earlier, due to the nature of wireless
channels, communications between the tag and the reader is susceptible to eavesdropping.
The conventional method uses encryption for confidentiality protection of transmitted mes-
sages. However, this requires to pre-share keys between the reader and the tag. As a result,
a key management and distribution system needs to be put in place. This introduces heavy
system overhead. In this work, we first propose a new PHY layer RFID privacy protec-
tion method which requires no pre-shared keys and would achieve the same goal. We also
perform theoretical analysis to first validate of our proposed scheme. Finally, we con-
duct experiments to further verify the feasibility our proposed scheme under the passive
eavesdropping attack model.
In the third work, we present a new attack on the FHSS RFID system called active
eavesdropping attack. In most semi-passive and passive RFID systems, tag to reader com-
munications are accomplished via backscattering modulation. This implies the tag is not
required to identify the frequency of the legitimate reader’s transmitted signal, it simply
responds to a reader’s query by setting its impedance in the circuitry to low and high to
represent bit 1 and 0. The attacker exploits this design weakness of the tag and broadcasts
his own continuous wave (CW) at a different frequency. Consequently, the eavesdropper
receives two copies of responses: one from his own broadcasted CW and one from read-
er’s CW. We perform theoretical analysis to show the optimal strategy for the attacker in
terms of the decoding error probability. Finally, we conduct simulations and experiments
to verify with our theoretical results.
iv
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1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Wireless technologies have blossomed in the last few decades. The large scale deployment
of these networks have made them readily accessible in most part of the world. From the
transmission rate of tens of kilobytes per second of the first generation (1G) mobiles in the
early 80s to the transmission rate of hundreds of megabytes per second proposed in the next
generation mobile standard LTE-advanced, from the voice only communication, to text and
messages, and now to live video streaming, the advancement of wireless technologies have
undoubtedly revolutionized the way people live around the world. Countless technologies
and products have been developed as a direct result of emergence of wireless technologies.
Figure 1.1 is an illustration of revolutionary path of wireless technologies in the past few
decades.
At the same time, Radio frequency identification (RFID) is another emerging tech-
nology which can perform the automated and unique identification of objects. The tiny,
inexpensive tag ability to contactlessly identify distant objects as far as tens of meters away
without the requirement of line of sight (LOS) is a very attractive property over some of
the existing technologies such as barcode. There are two main advantages of RFID over
the older similar barcode technology [62]: First, RFID provides the unique identification of
each object. This is because each RFID tag is issued with an unique identification (UID)
number that distinguishes itself from all other tags. Second, the scanning of barcode would
require LOS contact between the reader and the object. Careful positioning of the tag is
required. The reading range is also very limited. However, for the RFID technology, each
reader is able to read tags from meters away regardless of environment they are in. Thus
2
Figure 1.1: Evolutionary Path of Wireless Technology [77]
RFID technology is much more convenient and effective in comparison with the barcode
technology. Because of these attractive properties, RFID technology has found a wide
range of applications. These include passport, driver’s license, building access control and
supply chain management just to name a few.
People’s life have been benefited tremendously by the emerging cellular and RFID
technologies. For example, people can make banking transactions with their cellular phones
at the comfort of their own home, or they can make payment at the any stores via their
near field communication (NFC) enabled cellular phones acting as credit cards. These two
technologies are omnipresent in every corners of the world today. There is no doubt our
lives have been greatly simplified as a result. We can accomplish much more in a shorter
time span.
However, with great technologies also come great risks and threats. Both cellular and
RFID systems have their own security and privacy concerns. A secure system is one in
which it performs exactly what it is supposed to do from the perspective of the legitimate
users. It will not behave unexpectedly regardless whether the adversary is present and
tries to alter the behaviour of the communication system. To achieve the above goals, the
three following well known criteria must be satisfied [79]:
• Confidentiality : This implies that the transmitted information can be disclosed only
to the intended receiver. No one else should be able to observe them. Confidentiality
is usually accomplished through cipher encryptions.
• Integrity : This implies that the transmitted information should not be modified.
Transmitted messages are subjected to corruptions by the network or malicious at-
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tacks, the receiving party should be able to identify if the messages have been cor-
rupted or altered. Integrity is usually ensured with the use of hash function.
• Non-repudiation: This implies that the transmitter cannot deny once it has sent the
message. This prevents the malicious act of transmitter from transmitting certain
messages and later on denies it. Non-repudiation is ensured via authentication with
keyed hash function or message authentication code (MAC).
On the other hand, privacy deals with the disclosure of user’s data to unwanted parties.
Specifically in RFID, privacy further divides into data privacy and location privacy [99].
Imagine a scenario where someone goes into a store and purchase some products, there
could be a malicious adversary that is distant away, yet he is able to obtain the information
from the RFID tags that are adhered to these purchased products with the help of a reader.
Moreover, since each tag contains an unique ID, the adversary can associate this particular
tag with this person. Thus, both the data and location information are disclosed. This
represents a clear violation of data and location privacies. In addition, it can lead to further
malicious attacks such as tag cloning and tracking.
1.2 Motivations
PHY layer security stems from Shannon’s milestone paper “Communication theory of
secrecy systems” [95]. In this work, Shannon proved it is not possible to break the system
which utilizes the one time pad (OTP) to secure the communication. However, OTP is
impossible to implement. In practice, stream ciphers [29, 40, 14, 45] or block ciphers
[18, 23] are usually used in place of OTP to secure the communication. This approach is
often referred to symmetrical key encryption.
Later on, Wyner proposed the wiretap channel model, in which there exists an adversary
who is able to intercept the communication between the two communicating parties [112,
81]. Under this setting, Wyner came up with the notion of secrecy capacity. It refers to
the maximum rate the two legitimate parties can communicate at while not leaking any
information to the adversary .
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman have discovered a new technique which is generally known
as public key encryption to secure the communication [25]. Since then, A number of
public key primitives have been proposed [25, 88, 27, 66]. Different from symmetrical key
encryption which is considered to be information theoretically secure, public key approach
is computationally secure. It relies on computational hard problems. These include discrete
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logarithm, integer factorization of the product of two large primes, etc. In this case, the
adversary without knowledge of the private key, will not be able to recover the transmitted
messages, even though the public key is accessible by everyone.
In addition, PHY layer is at the lowest layer of a network protocol stack. The advantages
of securing networks in this layer include: 1) Introducing lowest system overhead; 2) Having
the lowest impact on the existing system; 3) Introducing very low latencies.
Motivated by the tremendous development of PHY layer securities in the past century
as well as the advantages of conducting security functionalities in the PHY layer, in this
thesis, we focus on providing security functionalities to wireless communication systems
via PHY layer approach.
1.3 Scope
This thesis will address three main topics in the current cellular and RFID communication
systems. These three topics are: 1) The encryption method in general wireless communica-
tion systems. 2) Tag to reader confidentiality protection in passive RFID systems. 3) The
vulnerability of frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) RFID systems against mali-
cious active eavesdroppers. For the first two major topics, we present our own solutions
and counter-measures via the use of PHY layer techniques. For the last topic, we present
the attack framework as well as mathematical formulations. Based on our formulations,
we analyze and derive the optimal solution for the malicious adversary.
1.4 Outline
Before we go into details discussing our main contributions in the thesis, we first give some
background which our work rely on. More specifically, we first give a short survey on
the cellular and RFID systems. We specifically focus on the security aspect of these two
systems.
For wireless cellular systems, we will introduce the historical developments of security
functions from the first generation (1G) mobile standard to the fourth generation (4G)
LTE standard. We will present the layered network protocol stacks. We will also discuss
the security features implemented in each layer. In addition, we will compare implemen-
tations of security functions in upper layers versus PHY layer. Finally, we will explain the
advantages of securing networks with PHY layer over upper layer approaches.
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For RFID systems, we will present the three main types of RFID systems as well as
the corresponding RFID standards. We will also show the differences among these three
systems. Moreover, we will identify the security risks and vulnerabilities of these RFID
systems. Some common attacks to compromising the security and privacy of these RFID
systems will also be discussed.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we first give a brief introduction of historical development cellular sys-
tems. We mainly focus on the security aspect. We introduce the security primitives
from 1G to LTE standards. Moreover, we present the network protocol stack of a
communication system. We briefly compare the securities being implemented at d-
ifferent layers of a network protocol stack. Finally, we present some of the common
attacks against a wireless communication system.
• In Chapter 3, we first give a brief overview of three types of RFID systems. Then we
present their security and privacy risks and vulnerabilities. We also introduce some
of the common attacks to a RFID system in the literature.
• In Chapter 4, we introduce necessary background information and knowledge, and
notations which we use repeatedly throughout this thesis.
• In Chapter 5, we introduce a new OFDM encryption scheme which we called OFDM-
Enc. In the current communication systems, the conventional approach encrypts data
at the bit level between the message bit and keystream bit through the use of the
exclusive OR (XOR) operation. This is referred to as XOR encryption (XOR-Enc).
It implies that the number of generated keystream bits required are the same as the
incoming message bits. This could be problematic in a mobile high speed application
as battery and computation power are extremely valuable. In this work, we propose
the encryption to be done at the symbol level. That is, encryption is performed by
multiplying each of in-phase and quadrature component of the modulated symbols
by a keystream bit. We provide an initial investigation on the security of OFDM-
Enc. Depending on the modulation type, OFDM-Enc would potentially reduce the
keystream size required for encryption, while still achieving the required security
level. In addition, we conduct simulations to compare OFDM-Enc and XOR-Enc.
We show indeed OFDM-Enc can achieve a good performance.
• In Chapter 6, we continue the work we started in Chapter 5. We extend the OFDM-
Enc work to general communication systems. Since the encryption is essentially
done by changing the phase of the data constellations, we just adopt the term phase
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encryption (P-Enc). In this chapter, we use mathematical models to compare XOR-
Enc and P-Enc for different modulation types in terms of efficiency, security and
hardware complexity. Moreover, we show P-Enc at the PHY layer can prevent traffic
analysis attack, which cannot be prevented with the upper layer encryptions. Finally,
simulations are conducted again to compare between these two encryption methods.
• In Chapter 7, we are interested in protecting tag’s data from leaking to or being
compromised by the malicious adversaries. Due to the nature of wireless channels,
communications between the tag and the reader are susceptible to interception and
eavesdropping. The conventional method uses encryption for confidentiality protec-
tion. However, this requires two communicating parties to pre-share a key. As a
result, a key management and distribution system needs to be put in place. This
introduces heavy system overhead. In this work, we first propose a PHY layer RFID
signaling scheme to protect the data confidentiality of messages transmitted from the
tag to the reader. In the process, the data privacy is ensured. Then we perform theo-
retical analysis to validate our proposed scheme. Finally, we conduct experiments to
further verify the feasibility of our proposed scheme under the passive eavesdropping
attack model.
• In Chapter 8, we present a new attack on the FHSS RFID system which is called
active eavesdropping attack. This attack utilizes the special property in that in most
semi-passive and passive RFID systems, the tag to reader communication is via
backscattering modulation. This implies the tag is not required to identify the read-
er’s transmitted signal frequency. Whenever the tag replies to the reader, it simply
sets its impedance to low and high to represent bit 1 and 0 respectively. The active
eavesdropper exploits this property and broadcasts his own continuous wave (CW)
at a different frequency. Thus he can obtain two copies of responses, one from his
own CW and one from reader’s CW. The active eavesdropper then tries to optimally
combine these two responses in order to achieve lowest decoding error probability.
Therefore, in this work, we perform theoretical analysis to show the optimal strategy
for the attacker. Finally, we conduct simulations and experiments to verify with our
theoretical results.
• In Chapter 9, the last chapter of this thesis, we first conclude and emphasize the
main contributions in our work. In addition, we also identify the problems which
have not been addressed or completed. These are the potential future work we can
pursue.
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Chapter 2
Historical Development of Cellular
Systems
2.1 Security from 1G to LTE
In this chapter, we intend to give a brief overview of the historical development of security
functions from the first generation mobile standard to the current LTE standard. We
put more focus on the LTE system as it is the most recent standard and it has seen a
tremendous growth in the recent years. We also present some common attacks against
wireless communication systems.
2.1.1 1G Security
The analog nature of 1G systems makes secure communications over the wireless channels
relatively difficult. As a result, there are no secure functions implemented in 1G cellular
standards. Anyone with an radio receiver can eavesdrop the communication session and
alter the transmitted information relatively easily.
2.1.2 2G Security
In GSM, there are three algorithms implemented to ensure the security. They are A3, A5
and A8 algorithms [79]. A3 and A8 are keyed hash functions which take in a 128-bit key
and 128-bit challenge as input and produce a 32-bit response for authentication and 64-bit
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response for encryption. These two algorithms are combined together and are implemented
via the COMP 128 keyed hash function. A5 is a stream cipher which takes in the plainext
and encrypts with the ciphertext derived from A8 algorithm. These three algorithms make
up the core functions of security in GSM.
In IS-95 or CDMAOne, a competing 2G standard to GSM, authentication and voice
encryption are accomplished via the cellular authentication and voice encryption (CAVE)
algorithm along with spread spectrum spreading sequences. The CAVE algorithm takes in
a 64-bit key, a 32-bit electronic serial number assigned to the mobile and a 56-bit random
number to generate a 128-bit shared secret data (SSD). The first 64 bits are used for
authentication and the last 64 bits are used for encryption. Moreover, each transmitted
message bit will be expanded by a spreading pseudo-noise (PN) sequence (m-sequence)
of degree 15 (length 215 − 1). This sequence is shared only by the legitimate transmitter
and the receiver. The spreading sequence genuinely creates difficulties for the adversary in
that without the knowledge of this spreading code, the adversary will not be able to easily
recover the message. Another benefit of spread spectrum communication worth mentioning
is its robustness against jamming.
2.1.3 3G Security
In UMTS, the successor to GSM, integrality and confidentiality are ensured through
UEA1/UIA1 (UEA refers to UMTS encryption algorithm and UIA refers to UMTS in-
tegrity algorithm) based on the block cipher Kasumi and UEA2/UIA2 based on the stream
cipher Snow 3G. Later on, UEA3/UIA3 based on the stream cipher ZUC has been added
into the standard [4]. These make up the core cryptographic functions in UMTS.
The first successor of CDMAOne, CDMA 2000 1xRTT is the initial 3G standard.
Similarly to CDMAone, CDMA 2000 1xRTT data is spread by a PN sequence or long
code of degree 42 (compared to degree 15 of CDMAOne). Moreover, CDMA 2000 1xRTT
uses the same CAVE algorithm as CDMAOne to generate 128-bit SSD secret. The first 64
bits are used for authentication. The last 64 bits are used alongside of CAVE algorithm to
generate a private long code mask, a 64-bit cellular message encryption algorithm (CMEA)
key and a 32-bit data key. The private long code mask is used to determine characteristics
of the long code. The CMEA key is used with the Enhanced CMEA algorithm to encrypt
and decrypt signaling messages exchanged between the mobile and the network, while the
data key is used to encrypt and decrypt data traffic through ORYX encryption algorithm
[110]. CDMA 2000 1xRTT later on evolved into CDMA 1xEV-DO or CDMA 2000 widely
known to most people. When this occurred, security architectures changed dramatically.
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Aforementioned security functions are no longer used. Instead, CDMA 2000 employs Secure
Hashing Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) for integrity check and advanced encryption standard (AES)
for encryption [84].
2.2 LTE System
The main purpose of the cellular phones has shifted since the new millennium. People are
no longer satisfied with just the voice calling, but rather, they want to do more with their
cell phones, such as surfing the web, watching videos, for both work and own pleasure. As
a result, there has been a tremendous growth and demands for faster and more reliable
networks in the recent years. The global mobile data traffic is expected to see a growth
of 26 folds between 2010 to 2015. It is expected to reach 6.3EB per month in 2015! This
trend is shown in Figure 2.1. According to Cisco, this trend of growth is not slowing down,
it will reach 15.9EB per month by 2018 [21]!
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Table 3. Global Mobile Data Growth Today is Similar to Global Internet Growth (Fixed) in the Late 1990s 
Global Internet Traffic Growth  Global Mobile Data Traffic Growth 
1997 178%  2008 156% 
1998 124%  2009 140% 
1999 128%  2010 159% 
2000 195%  2011 (estimate) 131% 
2001 133%  2012 (estimate) 113% 
Source: Cisco VNI Mobile, 2011 
 
In the long term, mobile data and fixed traffic should settle into the same growth rate, although the mobile data 
growth rate is likely to remain higher than the fixed growth rate for the next 7 to 10 years. 
Global Mobil  Data Tr ffic, 2010 to 2015 
Overall mobile data traffic is expected to grow to 6.3 exabytes per month by 2015, a 26-fold increase over 2010. 
Mobile data traffic will grow at a CAGR of 92 percent from 2010 to 2015. Annual growth rates will taper over the 
forecast period from 131 percent in 2011 to 64 percent in 2015 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1.   Cisco Forecasts 6.3 Exabytes per Month of Mobile Data Traffic by 2015 
 
 
Western Europe and Asia Pacific will account for over half of global mobile traffic by 2015, as shown in Figure 2. 
Middle East and Africa will experience the highest CAGR of 129 percent, increasing 63-fold over the forecast period. 
The emerging market regions (Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Middle East and Africa) will have the 
highest growth and will represent an increasing share of total mobile data traffic, from 12 percent at the end of 2010 
to 20 percent by 2015. 
Figure 2.1: Global Mobile Traffic per Month [20]
The LTE system, or commercially known as the 4G LTE will be the primary cellular
standard to provide the services to meet people’s demands. LTE was studied in 2004 by
the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The first deployment of LTE network was
back in 2010.
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The changes and improvements of LTE over the existing 3G system are drastic. The
PHY layer has completely been redesigned. The followings are a brief description of the
few requirements set forth by LTE at the PHY layer [9]:
• Increased Spectral Flexibility: LTE supports scalable bandwidths of 1.4, 3, 5, 10, 15
and 20MHz, which is upped from 5MHz of previous 3G system.
• Data Rate: LTE supports a maximum downlink peak data rate of 300Mbps in a
20MHz channel (using 64 QAM and 4 × 4 MIMO). The uplink peak data rate is
75Mbps (using 64 QAM).
• Latency: Reduced latency (≤ 10ms, user plane) for data transmission and state
transitions (50-100ms, control plane).
• Packet switched infrastructure: To simplify the network structure, LTE transits from
circuit and packet switch combined network of UTMS to purely packet switching
network.
Moreover, in the PHY layer, LTE employs orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(OFDM) for downlink data transmission, which is totally different from CDMA of all 3G
systems. OFDM is a multiplexing method in which data are transmitted over the equally
spaced, overlapped carrier frequencies. The corresponding multiple access scheme is the
orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA).
The advantages of OFDM include:
• It has high spectral efficiency and can support various underlying modulation schemes,
such as PSK, QAM in order to achieve a high data rate.
• It can resist against intersymbol interference (ISI) as a result of longer symbol time
and artificially introduced cyclic prefix (CP).
• Equalization is also simplified with each OFDM symbol containing multiple narrow-
band signals rather than one large wideband signal. Relatively simple equalizers can
be efficiently implemented [105, 90].
• The modulation and demodulation of OFDM signals can be implemented in hardware
efficiently using Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) and Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) respectively.
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However, OFDM is not without its disadvantages. There are two major disadvantages
with OFDM system. 1) It is susceptible to carrier frequency and phase offset due to local
oscillator offset and/or doppler shifts. 2) It potentially has a large signal peak-to-mean
envelope power ratio (PMEPR) [96]. The high PMEPR would potentially damage the
power amplifier and it is power inefficient. It is for this reason that the uplink transmission
in LTE uses single carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA).
2.2.1 LTE Security
LTE is overseen by 3GPP which is the same group responsible for developing the 3G UMTS
system. Although its air interface is completely different from UMTS, its security functions
are very similar. Stream ciphers Snow 3G and ZUC from UTMS continue to be part of
the standard in LTE. The only difference is that block cipher Kasumi is now replaced by
AES.
The security functions provided by LTE E-UTRAN including the data integrity and
confidentiality protections are performed in the PDCP layer prior to adding the PDCP
header. Earlier systems including UTMS and CDMA2000 have similar structures as LTE.
All security functions are implemented in layer 2 or layer 3 of a protocol stack.
We now show the layered architecture of E-UTRAN. E-UTRAN handles the com-
munication between the mobiles and evolved packet core (EPC). The protocol stack of
E-UTRAN is shown in Figure 2.2. The IP data packet from upper layers passes through
the PDCP, RLC, MAC and finally down to the PHY layer. In LTE, packets received by
each layer are called service data units (SDUs), while packets at the output of a layer are
called protocol data unit (PDUs). The PDU generated in a layer is formed by potential-
ly combing multiple SDUs, adding additional information to the SDUs and prepending a
header at the beginning as shown in Figure 2.2. Upon leaving the lowest PHY layer, the
signals grouped in slots are transmitted over the wireless channel.
2.3 Network Architecture
To facilitate communication between two entities, whether it would be a computer to
another computer, a computer to a mobile or to other devices, as shown in Figure 2.3,
they all involve a high degree of cooperation between the two communicating parties. The
hardware components of these devices can be vastly different. Thus, a common protocol
is required.
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Figure 2.2: E-UTRAN Layered Protocol Stack [72]
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Figure 2.3: Wireless Communications between Different Devices
Instead of implementing the protocol as a single layered module, it is composed of
multiple sub-layer protocols which are implemented separately in a vertical stack as shown
in Figure 2.4.
Application Application
Transport Transport
Network Network
Link Link
Physical Physical
Wireless Channel
1
Figure 2.4: Network Protocol Stack
In the previous section, we have shown the protocol stack concerning the security
functions of E-UTRAN in a LTE network. These security functions are considered to be
part of the link layer in the overall network protocol stack as shown in Figure 2.4.
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In a network protocol stack, each layer in the stack performs a specific set of functions.
Each layer relies on the lower layer to perform more primitive functions to conceal the
details of functions implemented in the current layer. Each layer also provides services to
the next higher layer. Moreover, in a layered network, each protocol layer of a device only
communicates with the identical protocol layer of another device [100]. The advantages of
layered approach compared to one single module include:
• Reduced complexity of network designs. Each layer only focuses on its own set of
functions or services.
• Modifications to one layer do not require modifications to other layers.
2.3.1 Upper Layer Security
Security functions can be implemented and in fact are implemented in every layer of the
protocol stack. The followings are a list of examples where security functions are imple-
mented at different layers of a network stack.
• End-to-end protection is ensured in the application layer.
• Transport layer is protected by secure sockets layer (SSL) standard.
• Network Layer is protected by IPSec standard.
• Link layer is protected by different aforementioned security functions from the pre-
vious section. It is system dependent.
The challenge lies in maintaining the performance of the communication system while
assuring the security and privacy of the transmitted user data. Typically, layer specific
information will be added to the packets when security functions are implemented at each
of these higher level layers. Therefore, system throughput will be affected. Researches
have shown that the overhead introduced by the security functions could degrade the
communication throughput substantially by as much as 20% [98]. Moreover, the header
information is generally not encrypted, useful information such as the destination of the
transmitted data could be exposed to the adversary. Finally, upper layer security functions
also propagate through the layered stack, this introduce added complexity. As a result,
sometimes it is not mandatory to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted
data. For example, in 3G UMTS, integrity and confidentiality protections are only applied
to control signals. Users’ data are only encrypted but not integrated protected.
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2.3.2 PHY Layer Security
PHY layer is at the lowest level in the protocol stack. It covers the physical interface
between a data transmission device and a transmission medium. PHY layer deals with
data at the bit level rather than the packet level. It also specifies the characteristics of the
transmission medium, the nature of the signals and the data rate [100]. Securing networks
with PHY layer approaches would not suffer the limitations of upper layer approaches
discussed above. More specifically, the advantages of the PHY layer approach include:
• Introduces no overhead. System throughput performance is guaranteed.
• Having the lowest impact on the network.
• No leakage of unprotected header information.
Thus, PHY layer security has received great attentions in securing the wireless communi-
cation networks.
2.4 PHY Layer Attacks in Wireless Communication
Systems
In this section, we give an overview of existing attacks to the wireless communication
systems that occur in the PHY layer. The attacks introduced here are by no means an
exhaustive list of all PHY layer attacks. It only shows some common attacks existed in
the literature and practise.
2.4.1 Eavesdropping Attack
Due to the nature of the wireless channels, the transmitted signals are susceptible to
the eavesdropping attack. The adversary simply tunes his receiver to the frequency used
between the tag and the reader, he can capture all the communications between the reader
and the tag. He may then try to recover useful information from the intercepted messages.
This is depicted in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Eavesdropping
2.4.2 Traffic Analysis Attack
The traffic analysis attack is a variant of the eavesdropping attack. It is defined as the
study of the external characteristics of signal communications and related materials for
the purpose of obtaining information concerning the operation of a communication system
[13].
2.4.3 Replay Attack
The adversary attempts to record one valid communication session’s interchanged messages
between the legitimate transmitter and receiver. He will then reuse these messages as his
credentials in a later communication session to bypass the security function and establish
a link with either the transmitter and/or receiver.
2.4.4 Jamming Attack
Unlike the previous attacks, the adversary’s goal in the jamming attack is no longer to
capture the communications in order to gain insights on the transmitted messages between
the transmitter and the receiver. Instead he wants to prevent the communication between
the two parties. He accomplishes this by creating a strong noise signal at the same fre-
quency utilized by the two communicating parties. Information received by the receiver
is corrupted by the strong noise signal. Consequently, decoding becomes very difficult.
Jamming attack is a variant of the denial of service (DoS) attack.
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Chapter 3
Overview of RFID Systems and
Securities
3.1 Introduction
RFID is a promising technology which can perform automated and unique identification
of objects. The biggest advantage of RFID technology over existing technologies such as
barcode is that the tiny, inexpensive RFID tag can be conveniently attached to objects for
seamless identification. Because of this attractive property, RFID technology has found
many applications in various industries.
A typical RFID system is consisted of three components: 1) One back-end database
which stores all tag’s information including keys for different purposes and objectives; 2)
One or multiple RFID readers which is securely connected to the database; 3) One or
multiple RFID tags. This is shown in Figure 3.1.
The reader to back-end database communication is via wired communication. The
back-end database supplies the reader with the information of the tag it tries to commu-
nicate. This include the key or unique identification (UID) of the tag. The reader to tag
communication is via the wireless communication channel.
In a RFID system, multiple readers can simultaneously communicate with different
tags. For the simplest case, let’s consider the communication between one reader and one
tag. Here we describe the interrogation process of semi-passive and passive RFID systems
using backscattering modulation in the uplink direction. Consequently, when the reader
tries to interact with a tag, it follows the procedures:
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Figure 3.1: Overview of a Typical RFID System
• The reader first sends a query to the tag. After issuing the command, the reader
keeps broadcasting a CW to provide the tag with sufficient power for computation
and communication.
• The tag “wakes up” by harvesting power from reader’s RF signal. It then interprets
the query and responds to the reader via backscattering modulation. In backscat-
tering modulation, the tag switches its impedance to either low or high to respond
a bit 1 or 0. The main reason for this design is the simplicity of the tag’s circuitry
and reduced cost of the tag [42].
• Upon receiving the tag’s response, the reader queries the collected information with
the connected back-end database for further processing and verifications. The com-
munication link between the reader and the tag is also established.
After establishing connection with the tag, the reader can issue various commands such as
read from memory, write to memory to the tag.
3.2 Types of RFID Systems
RFID does not simply refer to one system, but rather it conveys a set of standards intended
for different applications. The goal of all of these standards is to perform automated
identification and tracking of tags that are attached to some objects. In general, RFID
tags can operate in three frequencies. 124 - 135kHz low frequency (LF) tags which has a
nominal read range up to half of a meter. 13.56MHz high frequency (HF) tags which has
a nominal read range of up to one meter. 860MHz - 960MHz ultra high frequency (UHF)
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Table 3.1: Different RFID Standards
Standard Operating Frequency Application
ISO 11784/11785 [51, 52] 124-135kHz Animal identification.
ISO 14223 [53] 124-135kHz Animal identification and reading data
from sensors.
ISO/IEC 14443 [54] 13.56MHz Proximity RFID devices used for building
access control.
ISO/IEC 15693 [55] 13.56MHz Vicinity RFID devices which have a higher
reading range than ISO/IEC 14443
proximity devices.
ISO/IEC 18092 [57] 13.56MHz Compatible with ISO/IEC 14443 and
ISO/IEC 15693, used for near field
communication (NFC).
EPC Class 1 Gen 2 [28] 860-960MHz Product tracking and supply chain
management, most deployed EPC tags
comply with ISO/IEC 18000 for the air
interface standard operating at
860MHz - 960MHz.
ISO/IEC 18000 [56] All Frequencies Gaming, healthcare, parametrical, product
tracking and supply chain management, etc.
tags which can read up to ten meters. Moreover, there are different RFID standards
specifying for the different operating frequencies, modulation schemes, coding schemes
and communication protocols. Table 3.1 summarizes various RFID standards targeted for
different applications operating at these three frequencies.
In addition, based on the power source that drives communications between the reader
and the tag, RFID tags can be classified into the following three classes [43]:
• Active: Active tags have their own battery source and can initiate the communica-
tion.
• Semi-Passive: Semi-passive tags have onboard battery that drives the chip’s circuitry.
However, to communicate with the reader, each tag still needs to harvest power from
the reader’s electromagnetic field.
• Passive: Passive tags have no built-in power source. These tags are the least powerful
tags among the three types of tags. Each tag relies on harvesting power from the
reader’s electromagnetic field to facilitate communications.
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Active and semi-passive tags both have on-board batteries, they are generally more
powerful. This may provide them with adequate storage capacity and computational ca-
pability. Passive RFID tags on the other hand are small and inexpensive, they can only
harvest power from the reader. In addition, their memory capacity is generally also very
limited. The first two classes of tags are powerful, implementations of secure cryptographic
primitives on these tags are possible. It is the later class of RFID tags that requires special
attentions.
3.3 RFID Applications
From the types of existing RFID standards with different specified operating frequencies,
we already have a sense of the wide range of applications for RFID technology. Indeed,
RFID technology is the most promising technology for performing automated identification
and tracking of objects. In the following, we list a few common RFID applications.
• Contactless Payment: This provides a more convenient way of making payments.
This application is generally well established and there have already been a wide
deployment of various contactless payment methods developed by different companies
and government agencies. e.g., Oyster cards and PRESTO cards are used for public
transportation in London, U.K and Ontario, Canada. In addition, Google Wallet
assists in payment transactions with the NFC enabled cell phones, etc.
• Access Control: RFID allows for more convenient and key-free access into build-
ings. Access control generally adopts proximity and vicinity cards, which stem from
ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 15693 standards. The operating frequency of this type
of RFID system is thus 13.56MHz. Additionally, using this method for access con-
trol would genuinely keep the record of who has entered and left the building, thus
allowing the tracking and monitoring of those individuals in case of the unexpected
event.
• Inventory Control and Product Tracking: Before RFID technology, barcode is the
dominant technology in performing the inventory control and product tracking. How-
ever, there exists numerous limitations with barcode technology: 1) It only has lim-
ited reading distance (typically a few centimeters); 2) It is read only and it requires
the reader and the barcode to be in line of sight of each other. On the contrary, RFID
technology does not have these limitations. The EPC Class 1 Gen 2 standard is set
to replace barcode technology. It operates at 860-960MHz with a nominal reading
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range of up to 10 meters. Therefore, objects can be quickly identified without being
required to move close to the reader. This would make the inventory control and
tracking much more efficient. Wal-Mart has already pushed the use of RFID tags
for conducting its inventory control. Some libraries have also implemented RFID
systems to facilitate book check-out and check-in.
• Implantation: In the recent years, RFID tags have been implanted into human body
to assist doctors in treating the patients, e.g. VeriChip system [22]. VeriChip records
patient’s identity and health record data. Therefore, by scanning the tag, the doctor
would immediately uncover the patient’s health history. However, VeriChip was
discontinued in 2010 due to health concerns. Nevertheless, this has been an active
topic in the research society. The implantation of application specific RFID tags into
different areas of human body have been proposed to assist the doctor in monitoring
a patient’s health.
3.4 Security and Privacy Concerns in RFID Systems
With great technology also comes with great concerns. The concerns about RFID systems
arise from three main areas:
• Privacy concerns: RFID technology raises two main privacy concerns. Data priva-
cy and location privacy. Both concerns with well-behaved tags disclosing unwanted
information to mis-behaved readers. RFID technology is designed such that a reader
can interrogate any tags within its reading range. It is this convenience feature of
RFID that has brought potential privacy risks. Any malicious adversary equipped
with a reader can obtain the tag’s data once he establishes the communication with
the tag. In this case, tag’s data is disclosed to the malicious adversary, and data
privacy is compromised. Furthermore, the malicious adversary can trace that person
by associating the tag with the person. Thus, user’s location privacy is violated.
• Authenticity concerns: RFID authenticity concerns focus on well-behaved read-
ers obtaining information from misbehaved tags. In this case, a misbehaved tag can
impersonate the legitimate tag. This can be accomplished via tag cloning and coun-
terfeiting, etc. The well-behaved readers may be fooled by the misbehaved tag into
believing it is communicating with a legitimate tag. The misbehaved tag could send
inaccurate information or even viruses to the reader. In the later case, the entire
RFID system is at the great risk.
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• Communication attacks: Many security threats and attacks arise as a result of
unprotected communications between RFID readers and tags. These include jam-
ming, traffic analysis, spoofing, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, denial of service,
replay and side-channel attacks, etc. These attacks also apply to general communi-
cation systems, which we have discussed in the previous chapter. These attacks can
compromise both the authenticity and privacy of the employed RFID system.
In conclusion, these three concerns can be classified into two classes, namely security and
privacy concerns. Overcoming these concerns can be a significant and difficult challenge.
This is because RFID tags do not have sufficient computational power and memory storage
to support standard cryptographic primitives. In this section, we will list some common
attacks in the literature belong to each of the security and privacy classes.
3.4.1 Security Concerns
Tag Cloning: This is also referred to as tag counterfeiting. In theory, each RFID tag
should have an unique ID. However, this may not be the case in practise. The adversary
may clone a tag by collecting all information from one tag and copying them onto a
brand new tag. If a tag does not have any clone resistant features, then performing tag
counterfeiting is a trial task.
Replay Attack: The adversary eavesdrops and intercepts the communication session
between the reader and the tag in one session. He then attempts to reuse these intercepted
messages as his credentials in a later communication session to bypass the security function
and establish a link with the tag and/or the reader.
Relay Attack: In the relay attack, the adversary attempts to intercept the messages
between the reader and the tag, and then he passes these messages on with or without
modifications to the tag. The ephemeral connection is relayed from the legitimate reader
to the tag through the adversary. The legitimate reader and tag still think they are
communicating directly with each other. Francis et. al. have demonstrated a practical
implementation of the relay attack on the NFC-enabled mobile devices [36]. Relay attacks
are further categorized into mafia fraud and terrorist fraud [11].
• Mafia fraud : The adversary acts as the man in the middle in relaying the information
between the two legitimate parities.
• Terrorist fraud : This is an extension of the mafia fraud in which the adversary is
helped by a legitimate but dishonest tag. The legitimate but dishonest tag and the
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adversary collaborate together to deceive the reader into believing that the tag is
within the close proximity to the reader when in fact it is outside the reading range
of the reader.
Side Channel Attacks: Side channel attacks take advantages of physical implementation
flaws of the cryptographic algorithms. The four main forms of side channel attacks are
timing attack [67], fault attack [12], power analysis attack [68] and electromagnetic (EM)
attack [48]. Power analysis / EM attack can be further classified into simple power analysis
(SPA) / simple EM attack and differential power analysis (DPA) / differential EM attack
respectively.
3.4.2 Privacy Concerns
Reader Impersonation: In this attack, the malicious adversary assumes the identity of
the legitimate reader. He then performs the standard communication with the legitimate
tags in order to gain insights to the tag’s data. Moreover, by associating the tag with
the user carrying the tag, both the user’s data and location privacies are violated. This
attack is easier to prevent compared to RFID tags, readers are much more powerful in
terms of computing power and memory storage. More sophisticated security features can
be implemented to thwart the reader impersonation attack.
Tracking and Profiling [99]: The adversary can build up a profile of each individual
person by gathering and aggregating information from the purchased products carrying
these RFID tags. This individual can also be tracked based on his profile. Thus, this is
also a violation of user’s data and location privacies.
In conclusion, it is imperative that the security and privacy of the RFID system to
be protected. However, due to the cost constraint, no standards have posed mandatory
requirements to ensure the security and privacy of the RFID system. Thus, almost all
RFID systems are subjected to these attacks. Therefore, finding a cost effective way to
ensure the security and privacy of the RFID system is of the great importance.
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Chapter 4
Fundamentals and Background
This chapter presents a list of notations, definitions and background information necessary
for the later chapters.
4.1 Notations
The followings are a list of notations which will be used throughout the thesis.
- We use bold letters to denote vectors. i.e., M = (M0, · · · ,MN−1).
- We use capital letters and lowercase letters to represent frequency and time domain
symbols respectively.
- For two vectors, w = (w0, · · · , wN−1) and z = (z0, · · · , zN−1), the term-wise product
of w and z is denoted as w · z = (w0z0, w1z1, · · · , wN−1zN−1).
- We denote wT to be the transpose of w.
- We denote ∗ as the convolution operator.
- We define keys to be seeds assigned to the user which are loaded into the stream
cipher to generate the keystreams. Keystreams are generated by the stream cipher
algorithm and are used for encryption.
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4.2 OFDM
In this section, we give a brief overview of the OFDM system, which includes the trans-
mitter and receiver. We also show conventional XOR-Enc in an OFDM system.
4.2.1 OFDM System
The baseband OFDM transmitter is drawn in Figure 4.1. Note here we omit data prepro-
cessing blocks such as source coding, interleaving and channel coding. The frequency do-
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Figure 4.1: Baseband OFDM Transmitter
main symbols M = (M0,M1, · · · ,MN−1) ∈ CN are modulated symbols to be transmitted.
We assume each modulated symbol Mk is independent, identically and uniformly distribut-
ed. The number of values Mk can take is 2
r, where r is number of bits per symbol and it will
depend on the underlying modulation scheme. i.e., r = 2 for QPSK and r = 4 for 16-QAM.
Their corresponding baseband time domain OFDM symbol m = (m0,m2, · · · ,mN−1) ob-
tained by performing inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT) on M is as follows:
mi =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
Mke
j2piik
N , i, k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (4.1)
In general, mi is also complex valued.
The baseband OFDM receiver is shown in Figure 4.2. During the demodulation, as-
suming the environment to be noiseless, symbols transmitted over different frequencies are
orthogonal, hence they will not interfere with each other. By simply applying the discrete
Fourier transform (DFT), correct modulated symbols can be recovered. This is shown as
follows:
Mk =
1√
N
N−1∑
i=0
mie
− j2piik
N , i, k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (4.2)
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Figure 4.2: Baseband OFDM Receiver
4.2.2 OFDM-Enc with Stream Cipher
When the stream cipher encryption algorithm is applied, the baseband OFDM transmitter
is shown in Figure 4.3. Keystreams K generated from stream ciphers are first bitwise
OXRed with messages S to produce ciphertext C. Then subcarrier mapping will now map
ciphertext instead of messages into modulated symbols. Finally, IDFT of the ciphertext will
be performed to obtain the encrypted OFDM symbols. Note that this encryption scheme
is generic and works for any communication systems not just OFDM. At the receiver, the
reverse procedures are performed to correctly recover the message.
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Figure 4.3: Conventional Stream Cipher Encryption
4.3 EPC Class 1 Gen 2 Standard
As briefly mentioned earlier, EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID standard is the dominant
standard for UHF RFID systems. It is expected to be widely adopted to replace barcode
for inventory control and product tracking among other applications. The EPC Class 1
Gen 2 standard specifies each tag to have four memory banks [28]. They are Reserved,
ECP, TID and User. Reserved memory bank is used to store the 32-bit access password and
32-bit “KILL” password. EPC memory stores the EPC number. TID memory contains
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class-identifier values. It may also contain tag and vendor specific data such as tag’s serial
number. User memory is optional which offers user specific data storage. For detailed
description on the EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID standard, the reader is referred to [28].
4.3.1 EPC Class 1 Gen 2 PHY Layer
In the EPC Class 1 Gen 2 standard, an interrogator or reader sends information to one or
multiple RFID tags by modulating the RF signal using the amplitude shift keying (ASK)
modulation with pulse-interval encoding (PIE) format. In this downlink direction, the bit
rate is between 26.7kbps - 128kbps.
In the uplink direction, a reader receives the information from the tag by transmitting
an unmodulated RF carrier or a CW and listen for the tag’s backscattered reply. The
tag harvests the energy from the reader’s CW and respond to the query by either setting
its impedance to high or low to return bit 0 and bit 1 respectively. Furthermore, FM0,
Miller-2, Miller-4 or Miller-8 encoding format is used by the tag. The uplink frequency
is between 40kHz - 640kHz. This implies the data rate in the uplink direction also falls
between 40kbps - 640kbps for FM0 encoded signals and 5kbps - 320kbps for Miller encoded
signals.
4.3.2 FCC Regulations on FHSS
The EPC Class 1 Gen 2 standard has specified the operating frequencies of Class 1 Gen
2 UHF tags to be between 860MHz - 960MHz. In addition, if FHSS is to be used, then
it also has to comply with the local regulation. In North America, FHSS is governed by
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [33]. In accordance with FCC, the frequency
hopping range in this spectrum should operate between 902MHz - 928MHz. Each hopping
frequency should be separated by a minimum of 25kHz or 20dB bandwidth, whichever is
greater than the adjacent hopping frequencies. Moreover, if the 20dB bandwidth is less
than 250kHz, the system should use at least 50 hopping frequencies and the average time
of occupancy on any frequency should not exceed 0.4s within a 20s period. If the 20dB
bandwidth of the hopping channel is 250kHz or greater, the system should use at least
25 hopping frequencies and the average time of occupancy on any frequency should not
exceed 0.4s within a 10s period. Finally, the maximum allowed 20dB bandwidth of a
hopping channel is 500kHz.
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4.3.3 EPC Class 1 Gen 2 Authentication Protocol
Authentication is needed in order to prove one’s identity. In the EPC Class 1 Gen 2
standard, only the reader authentication is implemented. The protocol is illustrated in
Figure 4.4. The notations used in the figure are provided in Table 4.1.
RFID Tag
RFID
Reader
1. ReqR
2. RT1
3. CCPwdM = APwdM ⊕RT14. Verify APwdM
= CCPwdM ⊕RT1
5. ReqR
6. RT2
7. CCPwdL = APwdL ⊕RT24. Verify APwdL
= CCPwdL ⊕RT2
1
Figure 4.4: EPC Class1 Gen2 RFID Authentication Protocol
Table 4.1: Symbol Notations
Notations Descriptions
ReqR Command requesting 16 bit random number
RTx 16-bit random numbers generated by the tag
APwd Tag’s 32-bit access password
APwdM 16 most significant bits of APwd
APwdL 16 least significant bits of APwd
In this authentication protocol, the reader first sends a command to the tag requiring
a 16-bit random number, upon receiving the random number sent by the tag, the reader
sends CCPwdM which is just the bitwise XOR value of the tag’s 16 most significant bits
of access password and the 16-bit random number. The tag verifies the CCPwdM by
performing the same XOR operations to remove the 16-bit random number and compare
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with its own password. The entire procedure is performed again with a different 16-bit
random number and the 16 least significant bits of the access password. The authentication
succeeds if verifications in both rounds by the tag are successful.
This authentication protocol is not secure at all. There exists a serious design flaw
in this protocol. RT1, RT2 are un-encrypted random challenge numbers which are sent in
the open channel. If the adversary intercepts RT1 and CCPwdM , he can recover APwdM .
By the same reasoning, once the adversary intercepts RT2 and subsequent CCPwdL, he
can also recover APwdL. Consequently, the adversary gains knowledge to tag’s all 32-bit
access password. The privacy of the tag is compromised. The design flaw of this protocol
puts the entire EPC Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID system at the great risk.
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Part II
PHY Layer Phase Encryption
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Chapter 5
New Efficient PHY Layer OFDM
Encryption Scheme
OFDM was first proposed by Chang [17]. It is a multiplexing method in which data are
transmitted over the equally spaced, overlapped carrier frequencies. OFDM has received
much attention in the recent years due the its ability to combat ISI with the help of CP and
frequency domain equalization [60]. As a result, it has been adopted in many standards.
These include next generation mobile technologies 3GPP LTE [7], IEEE 802.16 WiMax
[50], digital audio broadcasting (DAB) [30] and digital video broadcasting (DVB) [31].
Meanwhile, the secrecy of messages has become increasingly more important in the
past decade. Almost all standards have incorporated security algorithms to ensure that
data has been securely transmitted over the channel. For instance, LTE has stream ciphers
SNOW 3G, ZUC and block cipher AES [5]. GSM has adopted stream cipher A5 [18], etc.
To ensure the secrecy of messages is not revealed to malicious adversaries, various
encryption mechanisms are usually applied to the messages before they are transmitted.
In conventional XOR-Enc, each message bit is independently encrypted with a keystream
bit through the XOR operation to produce one ciphertext bit. At the receiver, the same
XOR operation between the ciphertext bit and the keystream bit is performed to recover the
message. In this approach, to produce one bit of ciphertext requires one bit of keystream.
This could be problematic in a high speed data transmission application with constrained
devices. For instance, 3GPP LTE standard has been designed to meet a downlink (DL)
peak data rate of 300Mbps [1]. Consequently, the keystreams generation rate has to be the
same to achieve the maximum security. Assuming the encryption cipher is AES [78] used in
counter mode, to the best of authors’ knowledge, although the rate can vary from 2.56Gbps
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to 62.6Gbps depending on the implementations, this require a hardware of 34.5kgates and
979.3kgates respectively [92]. It is impractical with constrained devices such as mobiles.
The smallest AES implementation requires 2.4kgates, but it can only generate keystreams
at a rate of 57kbps [75]. This does not nearly meet the requirement set forth by LTE.
P-Enc was first introduced in optical encryptions. It is a promising technique that takes
advantage of high resolution optical materials [59]. In the field of electronic ciphering,
various encryption techniques for OFDM systems have also been proposed, such as chaos
based constellation scrambling [64], masked approach [19] and noise enhance approach [87].
None of these techniques would solve the problem described above.
In this chapter, we investigate how we could more efficiently encrypt the data while still
achieving the acceptable level of security. The main focuses of this chapter are summarized
below:
• We propose a new PHY layer encryption scheme for OFDM systems which we call
OFDM-Enc. This scheme is computationally secure against the adversary. The
encryption is performed by changing the sign (phase) of the time domain OFDM
samples. This is equivalent to performing a nonlinear masking on the frequency
domain symbols.
• An initial investigation on the encryption efficiency and security of this new scheme
is evaluated. Various attacks are explored. These include known plaintext and ci-
phertext attack, frequency domain attack, time domain attack and random guessing.
• Simulations are performed to compare the performance in terms of decoding symbol
error rate (SER) between OFDM-Enc and XOR-Enc.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we state the system and
adversarial models. In Section 5.2, we present detailed OFDM-Enc scheme. In Section 5.3,
we perform a thorough security analysis on our proposed scheme. We show OFDM-Enc
is secure under attacks considered in this chapter. In Section 5.4, we present simulation
results between OFDM-Enc and XOR-Enc. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.
5.1 System and Adversarial Models
In this section, we introduce the system and adversarial models our work is based on.
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5.1.1 System Assumption
We consider a standard communication system utilizing OFDM modulation as its air inter-
face. We assume the system setting is composed of one transmitter and one receiver. We
further assume they pre-share a secret key, and they each have two pseudorandom sequence
generators (PRSG). Using the pre-shared key, these two PRSG produce two keystreams a
and b, where ai and bi ∈ {−1, 1}. These two keystreams are used for encryption. Alterna-
tively, one PRSG can be used instead and the generated keystreams are divided into two
keystreams.
5.1.2 Adversarial Model
We consider a passive eavesdropper attacking model. The adversary’s goal is to recover the
data contents from the intercepted encrypted signals. We assume the adversary has the
complete knowledge of the channel and protocols used for transmission. He can intercept
all messages exchanged between the transmitter and the receiver. From this, he can use
various techniques to try to recover the key, keystreams and/or messages. We do not
consider the scenario where the adversary can exploit the weaknesses in the PRSG to
recover keys and/or keystreams, we assume the PRSG itself is perfectly secure.
5.2 OFDM-Enc Scheme
OFDM-Enc is drawn from the idea that OFDM symbols are sensitive to phase noise [76].
The encryption is performed by varying the sign (phase) of each of in-phase and quadrature
component of time domain OFDM samples according to two binary keystreams. In the
process, the orthogonality property of the OFDM symbols is destroyed. Without the
knowledge of these two keystreams, the adversary will encounter a high error probability
when he tries to decode.
5.2.1 Encryption and Decryption of OFDM-Enc
In this section, we illustrate the encryption and decryption process of OFDM-Enc.
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Encryption The transmitted N -point time domain OFDM symbol after the encryption
can be represented as follows:
ci = Re{
N−1∑
k=0
Mke
j2piik
N } × ai + jIm{
N−1∑
k=0
Mke
j2piik
N } × bi, (5.1)
where i, k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. This is shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: OFDM-Enc Encryption
This is equivalent to having two pseudo-random sequences a and b acting on the real
and imaginary part of time domain data symbols mi from (4.1):
ci = Re{mi} × ai + jIm{mi} × bi. (5.2)
Decryption At the baseband, the intended receiver obtains the ciphertext c = (c0, · · · , cN−1).
It first locally generates two pseudorandom sequences a and b, then he computes
Re(mi) = ai ×Re(ci) and Im(mi) = bi × Im(ci). (5.3)
This is shown in Figure 5.2. After recovering m, it follows the standard OFDM receiver
structure, the information bits are reconstructed.
For the adversary, since he does not share the keystreams with the transmitter, he
cannot generate the pseudorandom sequences a and b. Consequently, the adversary cannot
perform the operations in (5.3).
The key difference between OFDM-Enc and XOR-Enc lies in when the data are being
encrypted. In XOR-Enc, data are encrypted by bitwise XOR operations in the frequency
domain before the IDFT block. In OFDM-Enc, encryption is performed by term-wise
multiplication in the time domain after the IDFT block. We use the following example to
illustrate the encryption and decryption process of OFDM-Enc.
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Figure 5.2: OFDM-Enc Decryption
Example 1 Assume N = 16 and the modulation scheme is QPSK. This implies OFDM
symbols are composed of 16 QPSK modulated subcarriers. Let S be information symbols
composed of 2 bits, M be modulated QPSK symbols, a and b be two keystreams. These
data parameters are shown in Table 5.1.
Encryption: We know
ci = Re{mi} × ai + jIm{mi} × bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15
After computing 16-point FFT, we have m and c respectively in Table 5.1.
Decryption: We will explore the decryption performed by both the legitimate receiver
and the adversary. Since the adversary does not have the keystreams, we assume his strat-
egy is to follow standard OFDM demodulation procedure on the ciphertext. We denote M
and S to be the demodulated and decoded symbol obtained by the legitimate receiver, M′
and S′ to be the demodulated and decoded symbol obtained by the adversary respectively.
The corresponding results are shown in Table 5.2. We observe in this particular example,
the adversary’s decoding SER is 13
16
or 81.25%.
5.2.2 Compressed Keystream Length
If Mk is a 2
r-ary modulated symbol, XOR-Enc requires r-bit keystreams to generate r-bit
ciphertext. In OFDM-Enc, even though Mk carries r-bit messages, it is always encrypted
by 2-bit keystreams.
We define the encryption efficiency to be the ratio of the generated ciphertext bits to
the required keystream bits. Then XOR-Enc would always have an encryption of 1, while
OFDM-Enc would have an encryption efficiency of r
2
.
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Table 5.1: Data Parameters, OFDM Symbols and Encrypted OFDM Symbols
S M a b m c
3 1− j −1 −1 −0.250 + 0.125j 0.250− 0.125j
0 −1 + j 1 1 0.469− 0.298j 0.469− 0.298j
3 1− j −1 1 0.037− 0.037j −0.037− 0.037j
1 −1− j −1 1 −0.144− 0.115j 0.144− 0.115j
0 −1 + j 1 1 −0.125 + 0.250j −0.125 + 0.250j
1 −1− j −1 −1 −0.401− 0.365j 0.401 + 0.365j
1 −1− j −1 1 −0.140− 0.037j 0.140− 0.037j
1 −1− j −1 −1 0.306− 0.048j −0.306 + 0.048j
2 1 + j 1 1 0.500 + 0.125j 0.500 + 0.125j
2 1 + j −1 1 0.238− 0.202j −0.238− 0.202j
0 −1 + j −1 −1 0.213− 0.213j −0.213 + 0.213j
0 −1 + j −1 −1 0.144 + 0.115j −0.144− 0.115j
2 1 + j 1 −1 0.375 0.375
0 −1 + j −1 −1 −0.306− 0.135j 0.306 + 0.135j
2 1 + j −1 −1 0.390− 0.213j −0.390 + 0.213j
1 −1− j −1 −1 −0.346 + 0.048j 0.346− 0.048j
For r ≥ 2, P-Enc always has an encryption efficiency greater or equal to one, which
indicates that keystreams required are less by using OFDM-Enc. Even for the worst case
of QPSK where r = 2, the keystreams required for both encryption schemes are identical.
The increased efficiency of OFDM-Enc may prove to be beneficial in constrained devices
and high speed applications.
5.2.3 Maintained PMEPR
As described in Chapter 2, one major drawback of OFDM is the potential high PMEPR.
In the case when all subcarriers add up constructively, PMEPR can be as high as N . This
may drive the power amplifier into the non-linear region, potentially damaging the power
amplifier and/or introducing non-linear distortions. In OFDM-Enc, by only changing the
signs of time domain signals, the magnitude of the transmitted of the encrypted and the
original OFDM samples remain unchanged. i.e., |ci| = |mi|, for 0 ≤ i < N . Thus, the
PMEPR of the transmitted encrypted OFDM symbols remain unaffected.
If the OFDM symbols are precoded to ensure a certain PMEPR level, then by adopting
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Table 5.2: Decoded Messages between the Legitimate Receiver and the Adversary
M S M′ S′
1− j 3 1.438 + 0.373j 2
−1 + j 0 0.977− 0.875j 3
1− j 3 −0.707− 0.457j 1
−1− j 1 −0.333− 0.977j 1
−1 + j 0 1.731− 1.042j 3
−1− j 1 0.156− 0.743j 2
−1− j 1 −0.034 + 0.631j 0
−1− j 1 −1.550− 0.344j 1
1 + j 2 −0.438 + 0.835j 0
1 + j 2 −2.184 + 0.374j 0
−1 + j 0 1.707− 0.043j 3
−1 + j 0 −0.874− 1.524j 1
1 + j 2 1.269 + 0.835j 2
−1 + j 0 1.051 + 0.757j 2
1 + j 2 1.034− 1.131j 3
−1− j 1 0.757− 0.156j 3
OFDM-Enc, the PMEPR of the encrypted OFDM symbols is maintained. Note that the
aforementioned schemes [64, 19] would not achieve this. PMEPR of encrypted OFDM
symbols will inevitably be different and even unpredictable from un-encrypted OFDM
symbols.
5.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we present security analysis on our proposed scheme. More specifically,
we consider four different attacks. They are plaintext and ciphertext attack, frequency
domain attack, time domain attack and random guessing attack. We show OFDM-Enc is
resilient against all these attacks.
5.3.1 Known Plaintext and Ciphertext Attack
If the adversary knows modulated symbols M, then he can compute the OFDM symbol
m. From (5.3), both ai and bi can be recovered. Therefore, he can recover the keystreams
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a and b. This is the same attack as the conventional cipher encryption.
Meanwhile, if the adversary only knows a subset of messages {M0,M1, · · · ,MN−1},
he cannot obtain all the correct time domain symbols. As a result, he can statistically
estimate a and b, but he is not guaranteed to recover any keystreams with 100% certainty.
More discussion on the recovery of messages given a subset of keys are comprised will be
discussed in the next section. Given a subset of keystreams to find messages are essentially
equivalent to given a subset of messages to find keystreams. In this case, OFDM-Enc is
more resistant against known plaintext and ciphertext attack.
5.3.2 Frequency Domain Attack
In this section, we explore the possibility of launching the attack in the frequency domain.
The adversary may attempt to directly apply the DFT F on c as follows and then perform
the decoding:
FcT = F{(a ·Re(m))T + j(b · Im(m))T}. (5.4)
We will try to express the above equation in the matrix format. Before this, we first
take a look at the scenario where no encryption was present. Then we will compare the
demodulation of un-encrypted messages with ciphertext from (5.4). From (4.1), if we write
Mk in terms of real part Xk and imaginary part Yk and e
j2piik
N in terms of cos(2piik/N) +
j sin(2piik/N) we have
mi =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
{(Xk + jYk)(cos(ikθN) + j sin(ikθN))},
where θN =
2pi
N
.
This gives
Re(mi) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
(Xk cos(θN ik)− Yk sin(θN ik)), (5.5)
Im(mi) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
(Xk sin(θN ik) + Yk cos(θN ik)). (5.6)
Thus we have the matrix representation of (4.1) as follows:
mT = F−1MT (5.7)
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where F−1 is an N by N matrix given by:
F−1 =
1√
N
(fik)N×N (5.8)
and fik = e
jikθN , 0 ≤ i, k < N . Writing m in terms of real part and imaginary part of M,
(5.7) becomes
m0
m1
m2
...
mN−1
 = F−1cos

X0
X1
X2
...
XN−1
− F−1sin

Y0
Y1
Y2
...
YN−1
+ jF−1sin

X0
X1
X2
...
XN−1
+ jF−1cos

Y0
Y1
Y2
...
YN−1
(5.9)
where
F−1cos =
1√
N

1 1 · · · 1
1 cos(θN ) · · · cos((N − 1)θN )
1 cos(2θN ) · · · cos(2(N − 1)θN )
...
...
...
1 cos(iθN ) · · · cos((N − 1)iθN )
...
...
...
1 cos((N − 1)θN ) · · · cos((N − 1)2θN )

(5.10)
and
F−1sin =
1√
N

0 0 · · · 0
0 sin(θN ) · · · sin((N − 1)θN )
0 sin(2θN ) · · · sin(2(N − 1)θN )
...
...
...
0 sin(iθN ) · · · sin((N − 1)iθN )
...
...
...
0 sin((N − 1)θN )) · · · sin((N − 1)2θN )

(5.11)
Thus, the time domain OFDM symbol in (4.1) can be rewritten in matrix format in cosine
and sine representations as follows:
mT = (F−1cos X
T − F−1sin YT ) + j(F−1sin XT + F−1cos YT ). (5.12)
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If no encryption is present, the receiver simply computes the DFT of received signal m
to recover the message M:
MT = FmT
= (Fcos + jFsin)((F
−1
cos X
T − F−1sin YT + j(F−1sin XT + F−1cos YT ))
= (Fcos(F
−1
cos X
T − F−1sin YT )− Fsin(F−1sin XT + F−1cos YT )) + j(Fcos(F−1sin XT + F−1cos YT )) +
Fsin((F
−1
cos X
T − F−1sin YT )).
where F = (f−1ik )N×N is an N×N matrix. Moreover, we know Fcos = (cos(ikθN))0≤i,k<N =
F−1cos , and Fsin = (sin(−ikθN))0≤i,k<N = −F−1sin , they are also N × N matrices. We can
simplify the above equations as follows:
MT = (F 2cosX
T + FcosFsinY
T + F 2sinX
T − FsinFcosYT ) + j(FsinFcosXT + F 2sinYT −
FcosFsinX
T + F 2cosY
T ) (5.13)
= (F 2cos + F
2
sin)X
T + j(F 2sin + F
2
cos)Y
T
= XT + jYT .
The multiplication between matrices FcosFsin = 0N×N . This is described in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 For two N ×N matrices defined by Fcos = (cos(ikθN))0≤i,k<N and Fsin =
(sin(−jkθN))0≤j,k<N , their product FcosFsin is an N×N zero matrix. i.e., FcosFsin = 0N×N .
Proof: Let FcosFsin = M
′
N×N , for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, since sin(−ikθN) = − sin(ikθN), we
have:
M ′ij = −
N−1∑
k=0
cos(k(i− 1)θN) sin(k(j − 1)θN)
= −
N−1∑
k=1
cos(k(i− 1)θN) sin(k(j − 1)θN).
Case 1. N is odd,
M ′ij =
(N−1)/2∑
l=1
[cos(l(i− 1)θN) sin(l(j − 1)θN) +
cos((N − l)(i− 1)θN) sin((N − l)(j − 1)θN)].
41
Since, l(i−1)θN+(N−l)(i−1)θN = NθN = 2pi and l(j−1)θN+(N−l)(j−1)θN = NθN = 2pi,
we have
cos(l(i− 1)θN) = cos((N − l)(i− 1)θN)
sin(l(j − 1)θN) = − sin((N − l)(j − 1)θN)
which implies that
cos(l(i− 1)θN) sin(l(j − 1)θN) + cos((N − l)(i− 1)θN)
× sin((N − l)(j − 1)θN)
= cos(l(i− 1)θN)[sin(l(j − 1)θN) + sin((N − l)(j − 1)θN)]
= 0.
Then we obtain M ′ij = 0 for all 0 ≤ i, j < N when N is odd.
Case2. N is even,
M ′ij =
(N/2)−1∑
l=1
[cos(l(i− 1)θN) sin(l(j − 1)θN)
+ cos((N − l)(i− 1)θN) sin((N − l)(j − 1)θN)]
+ cos((N/2)(i− 1)θN) sin((N/2)(j − 1)θN).
Terms in the summation is equal to 0 as proved in the odd case. The only difference is the
extra term
cos((N/2)(i− 1)θN) sin((N/2)(j − 1)θN).
However,
(N/2)(j − 1)θN = (j − 1)pi
and
sin((j − 1)pi) = 0,
which implies that
cos((N/2)(i− 1)θN) sin((N/2)(j − 1)θN) = 0.
Then we obtain M ′ij = 0 for all 0 ≤ i, j < N when N is even. Therefore, we have proved
that M ′ij = 0N×N .
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Consequently, we say Fcos is orthogonal to Fsin. Moreover, F
2
cos + F
2
sin = I, where I
is an N × N identity matrix. Therefore, at the end of the DFT, receivers can correctly
reconstruct message symbols M assuming the environment is noiseless.
Now examine the scenario where encryption has applied to the time domain OFDM
symbols. The encrypted OFDM symbol defined in (5.2) is given in matrix form by
cT = Da(F
−1
cos X
T − F−1sin YT ) + jDb(F−1sin XT + F−1cos YT ), (5.14)
whereDa andDb are diagonal matrices with elements {a0, a1, · · · , aN−1} and {b0, b1, · · · , bN−1}
respectively.
If the adversary still directly takes the Fourier transform of c, he can obtain the following
result:
FcT = Fcosc
T + jFsinc
T
= (FcosDaFcosX
T + FcosDaFsinY
T + FsinDbFsinX
T − FsinDbFcosYT ) +
j(FsinDaFcosX
T + FsinDaFsinY
T − FcosDbFsinXT + FcosDbFcosYT . (5.15)
Here, we clearly see the differences between un-encrypted messages and encrypted mes-
sages in the view of the adversary by comparing (5.13) and (5.15). There will be two types
of distortions introduced. First, two matrices Fcos and Fsin are multiplied by another ma-
trix Da in between, which implies their product is not 0, so they are no longer orthogonal.
Second, FcosDaFcos + FsinDbFsin and FcosDbFcos + FsinDaFsin are longer adding up to a
identity matrix as they do in (5.13). Consequently, for the adversary, by simply applying
the standard demodulation procedure on the encrypted signals, he will demodulate the
real part and imaginary part of time domain symbols into X′ and Y′ frequency domain
signals as:
X′ = FcosDaFcosXT + FsinDbFsinXT + FcosDaFsinYT − FsinDbFcosYT (5.16)
Y′ = FsinDaFcosXT − FcosDbFsinXT + FsinDaFsinYT + FcosDbFcosYT (5.17)
Note that these two types of decoding distortions are all non-linear from the frequency
domain perspective. The encrypted OFDM symbols by OFDM-Enc is equivalent to non-
linear masking when viewed in the frequency domain.
The optimal detector should satisfy maximum aposterior probability (MAP) conditions.
If each symbol is transmitted with equal probability, MAP decision rule is equivalent to
maximum likelihood (ML) decoding. Moreover, if the channel is corrupted by additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN), then the optimal detector would become the minimum
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distance decoder [83]. Assuming this is the case, it is shown later in the simulations that
without the knowledge of a and b, these distortions will cause the decoded symbols fall
randomly among the different decision regions. Thus, the correct decoding probability Pc
is same as random guessing at:
Pc =
1
2r
,
where 2r is the underlying modulation rate.
5.3.3 Time Domain Attack
If i = 0, the real and imaginary portions of the OFDM symbol from (5.5) and (5.6)
respectively become:
Re(m0) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
Xk, (5.18)
Im(m0) =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
Yk. (5.19)
If QPSK modulation is employed where Xk, Yk ∈ {1,−1}, because we know the total
number of subcarriers is N , we have also known the difference between transmitted 1’s and
−1’s in X and Y is Re(m0) and Im(m0) respectively. Consequently, the adversary can
recover the exact number of 1’s and −1’s in the message blocks. The searching complexity
C to recover the 2N bits message block now becomes:
C =
(
N
m
)
×
(
N
n
)
, (5.20)
where m and n are respectively the number of 1’s transmitted in the real and imaginary
part of m0.
This is not an immediate threat to this scheme. In a system where N = 128, which
is the minimum FFT size in LTE [1], it can be shown that as long as number of 1’s or
−1’s exceed 15 for each of real and imaginary block, the searching complexity to correctly
recover M would exceed 2128. Using elementary probability, in a message block of 128 bits,
the probability it contains less than only 16 1’s or −1’s is less than 8.930× 10−20.
In the case of higher rate modulation schemes where r > 2, this attack becomes even
more difficult as more combinations of X and Y would satisfy (5.18) and (5.19).
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5.3.4 Random Guessing of OFDM Symbols
We assume that both XOR-Enc and OFDM-Enc use the same PRSG. The number of
keystreams required for encryption is rN in XOR-Enc and 2N in OFDM-Enc. If the
adversary randomly guess the keystreams, then the successful probabilities of XOR-Enc,
denoted as Psucc,XOR−Enc and OFDM-Enc denoted as Psucc,OFDM−Enc, are given by
Psucc,XOR−Enc = 2−rNand Psucc,OFDM−Enc = 2−2N .
In this case, XOR-Enc is more resistant to random guessing for r > 2. This is because it
utilizes more keystreams than OFDM-Enc. However, for N > 64,
Psucc,OFDM−Enc = 2−2N < 2−128.
The smallest FFT size in LTE is N = 128. Thus, this attack of directly random guessing
of the keystream bits is not a threat to those real systems.
5.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we have conducted three simulations in MatLab to demonstrate the per-
formance of OFDM-Enc compared to XOR-Enc. The cipher used is AES in counter mod-
e which is the EEA2 confidentiality algorithm incorporated in LTE [5]. The odd bit
keystreams are used for encrypting real portion of the OFDM samples. The even bit
keystreams are used for encrypting imaginary portion of the OFDM samples. All simula-
tion results are averaged over 105 OFDM symbols. Throughout all simulations, we assume
the adversary tries to recover the message by directly applying the DFT on the encrypted
OFDM symbols and then perform the decoding. Finally, we assume the channel is AWGN
channel.
5.4.1 Simulation 1: Performance Evaluations under Different
Noise Levels
The first simulation we conducted was to test the performance of the adversary under var-
ious noise level settings compared to a legitimate receiver. We simulated this with QPSK
and 16-QAM as its underlying modulations. The FFT size is 256 and the signal-to-noise-
ratio (SNR) ranges between 5dB - 20dB. This is shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Performance of the Legitimate Receiver and Adversary under Different Noise
Level with QPSK Modulation
From the plot and numerical data, we observe that for both modulation schemes, SER of
the legitimate receiver decreases very quickly as SNR increases. SER reaches to 0 at 14dB
for QPSK modulated OFDM symbols and less than 10−5 at 20dB for 16-QAM modulated
OFDM symbols. On the other hand, the decoding SER for the adversary stays approxi-
mately at 75% and 93.5% for QPSK and 16-QAM modulated OFDM symbols respectively
throughout all SNR values. This implies the adversary’s decoding successful rate is equiv-
alent to random guessing over all QPSK and 16-QAM symbols. This shows OFDM-Enc
has achieved optimal SER for the adversary, where optimal implies the adversary can do
no better than random guessing.
5.4.2 Simulation 2: Performance Evaluations under Compro-
mised Keystreams Settings
The second simulation we conducted was to compare the decoding SER of XOR-Enc with
OFDM-Enc under the assumption that a portion of keystreams is compromised. We have
simulated three modulation schemes: QPSK, 16-QAM and 64-QAM. The FFT size is
still kept at 256 and SNR level is 30dB. For QPSK modulated symbols, the required
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Figure 5.4: Performance of the Legitimate Receiver and Adversary under Different Noise
Level with 16-QAM Modulation
keystreams between XOR-Enc and OFDM-Enc are the same at 512 bits. In 16-QAM
and 64-QAM modulated OFDM symbols, the required keystream length for XOR-Enc is
4 bits and 6 bits per subcarrier respectively. These require two times and three times
of keystreams of OFDM-Enc at 1024 bits and 1536 bits respectively. As a result, we
performed two simulations on XOR-Enc with 16-QAM and 64-QAM modulated OFDM
symbols. First, we simulate the scenario where only the first bit of in-phase and quadrature
components mapped to each subcarrier is encrypted. This is to make XOR-Enc utilizing
the same amount of keystreams as OFDM-Enc. We call this “XOR-Enc with Half Key
Length” for 16-QAM modulation and “XOR-Enc with One Third Key Length” for 64-
QAM modulation. In these cases, the adversary would immediately recover half and two
third of the information bits. The searching space is drastically reduced. This is not
secure at all! Second, we simulate the case where each message bit is encrypted by a
keystream bit. We call this “XOR-Enc with Full Key Length” for both 16-QAM and 64-
QAM modulations. Moreover, when we say k “Compromised Key Pairs”, that implies first
k pairs from keystreams a and b are compromised. The results for QPSK, 16-QAM and
64-QAM modulated symbols are shown in Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 respectively.
For QPSK modulated OFDM symbols, SER of OFDM-Enc is slightly less than XOR-
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Enc, which implies the performance of XOR-Enc is slightly better. SER decreases linearly
with increased compromised keystreams in XOR-Enc with all three modulations. This
is expected because one bit of compromised keystream directly transforms into one bit
recovered message. However, this is not the case with OFDM-Enc. In OFDM-Enc, each
compromised pair of keystream would imply only one time domain sample is correct, which
contributes to a small portion of signal being correct on each frequency. However, the
correct decoding of messages will rely on all time domain samples being correct. Therefore,
there is no assurance on the number of recovered bits given a certain amount of keystreams
are being compromised. As a result, the behaviour of OFDM-Enc generally is not linear.
This is more evident in the simulations for 16-QAM and 64-QAM.
For both 16-QAM and 64-QAM modulated OFDM symbols, we note that for XOR-
Enc with half key length and one third key length, because of the reduction in the key
sizes, the decoding SER rate for the attacker is always only 1
4
. This is due to the one to
one mapping between the keystream bit and the message bit. The un-encrypted bits are
already known to the attacker. This is not the case with OFDM-Enc. Therefore, we can
easily observe that SER is almost always higher with OFDM-Enc when keystreams of the
same length are used. SER drops very slowly initially. In some scenarios, OFDM-Enc has
better performance than XOR-Enc with full keystream length. This occurs when curve
labeled in ‘o’ is above curve labeled in ‘x’ in Figures 5.6 and 5.7.
For OFDM-Enc scheme, one important note we want to point out is that in 64-QAM
modulated OFDM symbols, SER is kept around 85% even though approximately 80% of
keystreams are compromised. We think this is a quite remarkable result. This implies that
OFDM-Enc is highly resistant to keystream compromises when higher modulation schemes
are used.
From these simulations, we can conclude that performance of OFDM-Enc is comparable
to XOR-Enc with a lower rate (QPSK) modulation scheme. However, it has much better
performance at higher rate (16-QAM and 64-QAM) modulation schemes when the same
amount of keystreams is used. In addition, the performance of OFDM-Enc is at least
comparable with XOR-Enc at full keystream length encryption until most keystreams are
compromised.
5.4.3 Simulation 3: Performance Evaluations under Different
FFT Sizes
The last simulation we performed was to see if OFDM is block size dependent, which
means we want to test if using OFDM-Enc, we get a different SER when a percentage
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Figure 5.5: Decoding SER when a Subset of Keystreams are Compromised with QPSK
Modulation
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Figure 5.6: Decoding SER when a Subset of Keystreams are Compromised with 16-QAM
Modulation
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Figure 5.7: Decoding SER when a Subset of Keystreams are Compromised with 64-QAM
Modulation
of keystreams are compromised for different FFT sizes N . Here, FFT sizes are chosen
to be 128, 256, 512, 1024 and 2048, which corresponds to different FFT size specified in
LTE [7]. The SNR level is maintained at 30dB. We further assume 25% of keystreams
are compromised with OFDM-Enc scheme. This implies only 12.5% of keystreams are
compromised with full XOR-Enc in 16-QAM modulated OFDM symbols. The results are
plotted in Figure 5.8 for QPSK and Figure 5.9 for 16-QAM. We can see clearly that in
both schemes, performance of OFDM-Enc are not affected by the FFT size. This implies
OFDM-Enc will have the same performance when different bandwidths are assigned. Other
percentage of compromised keystreams were also tested to confirm this result. Note again
in this particular example, as shown in Figure 5.9, SER of OFDM-Enc is almost 20% higher
than XOR-Enc with the same keystreams and approximately 7% higher than XOR-Enc
with less keystreams. This implies OFDM-Enc has a greater impact on the adversary in
terms of the decoding SER due to non-linear transformation of FFT block.
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Figure 5.8: Performance of QPSK Encryption with Different FFT Sizes
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Figure 5.9: Performance of 16-QAM Encryption with Different FFT Sizes
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5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced a new PHY layer OFDM encryption scheme which
we call OFDM-Enc. This scheme is computationally secure against malicious adversaries.
This scheme encrypts the message by term-wise multiplication of each of the in-phase and
quadrature components of time domain OFDM symbols with keystreams a and b, where
a and b are {-1, 1} valued binary sequences. This is equivalent to non-linear masking in
the frequency domain. Furthermore, this scheme will not alter the PMEPR values of the
transmitted OFDM symbols.
There are two distinct differences between XOR-Enc and OFDM-Enc. 1) In XOR-Enc,
knowing one bit of keystream will guarantee the recovery of one bit message. However,
for OFDM-Enc, knowing one bit of keystream will only allow one to recover the correct
sample for that time instance. Correct decoding of any message symbol relies on all time
domain samples to be correct. Thus, there is no assurance on the number of recovered bits.
2) Without taking channel coding into consideration, OFDM-Enc requires less keystreams
compared to XOR-Enc. This is because in XOR-Enc, there is a one to one correspondence
between the message bit and the keystream bit, any reduced key size would directly result
in exposed information bits. In OFDM-Enc, each symbol containing multiple bits (≥ 2) is
encrypted using two bits.
An initial investigation was conducted to evaluate the security of our proposed scheme.
We have shown our scheme can withstand all four attacks considered in this chapter,
namely plaintext and ciphertext attack, frequency domain attack, time domain attack and
random guessing.
In terms of decoding SER for the adversary, simulations have shown that OFDM-
Enc would perform almost as well as XOR-Enc with QPSK subcarrier modulations. It
performs far superior with higher modulation schemes when using the same keystream
length. Moreover, OFDM-Enc is highly resistant to keystream compromises. Finally,
OFDM-Enc decoding performance is not FFT size dependent.
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Chapter 6
Extension of OFDM-Enc to General
Communication Systems
In the previous chapter, we have proposed a new encryption scheme which called OFDM-
Enc for systems utilizing OFDM as its air interface. OFDM-Enc encrypts data by multi-
plying the real and imaginary components of time domain OFDM samples by two {1,-1}
binary keystreams and it is used to provide the data confidentiality protection in LTE.
OFDM-Enc is performed on the time domain OFDM samples, due to the non-linear trans-
formation of IDFT, OFDM-Enc creates non-linear distortions in the frequency domain,
making the decoding error rate greater than XOR-Enc when the malicious adversary tries
to decode without performing decryption first.
Since OFDM-Enc encrypts data by changing the phase of the modulated symbols,
in this chapter, we just adopt a more general term P-Enc. In general, P-Enc is not
system dependent or rely on a specific underlying modulation scheme. In fact, P-Enc
is first introduced in optical encryptions [86, 59]. In this chapter, we extend P-Enc to
general communication systems independent of the modulation type. We show P-Enc used
under our context can be extended to ASK, PSK and QAM modulations, but not to FSK
modulation.
The main focuses of this chapter include:
• We generalize P-Enc to general wireless communication systems.
• We show the mathematical formulations of P-Enc and conventional XOR-Enc for
different types of modulation.
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• We conduct theoretical analysis to compare XOR-Enc and P-Enc in terms of their
security, encryption efficiency and hardware complexity.
• We show P-Enc at the PHY layer can prevent traffic analysis attack, which cannot
be prevented with the upper layer encryptions.
• We conduct simulations to compare the performance of XOR-Enc and P-Enc in terms
of the decoding SER.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we introduce the general
P-Enc scheme. In Section 6.2, we first present the mathematical formulations for XOR-Enc
and P-Enc. Then using our mathematical formulations, we compare these two encryption
methods in terms of security, encryption efficiency and hardware complexity. In Section
6.3, we first show how P-Enc in the PHY layer can prevent traffic analysis attack. Then we
compare XOR-Enc and P-Enc at the system level by taking into considerations of channel
coding. In Section 6.4, we conduct simulations to compare the performance of XOR-Enc
and P-Enc in terms of the decoding SER. Section 6.5 concludes this work.
.
6.1 P-Enc in a Communication System
In this section, we present the P-Enc scheme. P-Enc is performed on the modulated
symbol. Each modulated symbol contains r = log2M bits of message, where M is the
constellation size. Figure 6.1 shows the general structure for P-Enc. In the figure, Q(x) is
a function that maps the message x to the modulated symbol. Q(x) is generally complex
valued and it is dependent on the type of the employed modulation. If Q(m) is complex
valued, we use two bits of keystream, one for the in-phase portion of the modulated symbol
and one for the quadrature portion of the modulated symbol. If Q(m) is real valued, then
only one branch is needed. In this case, the keystreams required are reduced by half.
Consequently, in P-Enc, the total keystreams required vary with the underlying modu-
lation as well as the constellation size M . This is different from XOR-Enc. We will explain
in details of P-Enc with different modulation methods and use mathematical models to
analyze each method in Section 6.2.
Example: An illustration of P-Enc of a QPSK modulated symbol is shown in Figure
6.2. Let the blue dot represent the modulated but un-encrypted symbol, after the encryp-
tion, the resulting encrypted symbol could lie on any of the blue or red dots depending on
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Figure 6.1: P-Enc Block
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Figure 6.2: Encryption Illustration
the value of the in-phase (real) and quadrature (imaginary) components of the keystream
as shown in the figure.
6.2 XOR-Enc vs P-Enc
In wireless communications, carrier modulation is often used. These carriers, namely
sinusoidal signals have three parameters: amplitude, frequency and phase. Transmitted
messages are modulated using one or multiple of these parameters. Consequently, the most
three common modulation methods are ASK, FSK and PSK modulations [113].
In this section, we first give a high level overview of XOR-Enc and P-Enc used in a
wireless communication system. Then we break down into modulation specific scenarios.
We will discuss a total of four modulation methods. In addition to the three aforementioned
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XOR-Enc Modulation
m c Q(c)
Figure 6.3: XOR-Enc in a Communication System
Modulation P-Enc
m Q(m) c′
Figure 6.4: P-Enc in a Communication System
modulation methods, we also discuss QAM, which is a combination of ASK and PSK
modulations. We use mathematical models to illustrate the difference between XOR-Enc
and P-Enc in these modulated communication systems. We further analyze and compare
the two encryption methods in terms of their security, encryption efficiency and hardware
complexity.
6.2.1 Overview of XOR-Enc and P-Enc in a Communication Sys-
tem
In this section, we omit the channel coding, source coding and other baseband functions,
we focus only on the modulation and encryption blocks. We will discuss XOR-Enc and
P-Enc on a system level by taking into considerations of channel coding in Section 6.3.
XOR-Enc and P-Enc in a communication system are illustrated in Figures 6.3 and 6.4
respectively. In these two figures, m is the message, again Q(x) is a function that maps
message x to the modulated symbol. c and c′ are the resulting modulated ciphertext
symbols for XOR-Enc and P-Enc respectively.
By comparing Figures 6.3 and 6.4, we observe the order of encryption and modulation
is reversed between XOR-Enc and P-Enc. XOR-Enc takes place prior to the modula-
tion. Consequently, XOR-Enc is independent of the modulation methods. On the other
hand, P-Enc takes place after the modulation, the required keystream size depends on the
underlying modulation scheme as well as the constellation size.
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6.2.2 Mathematical Formulations of XOR-Enc and P-Enc with
Different Types of Modulation
In an M-ary modulated communication system, as discussed earlier, each modulated sym-
bol contains r = log2M bits of message. For XOR-Enc, the incoming message bits are first
bitwise XORed with the keystream bits. Then the resulting ciphertext c is divided into
multiples of r-bit tuples. i.e., ci ∈ Fr2, where i = 1, 2, · · · . The modulation is performed
on each encrypted r-bit tuple. On the other hand, for P-Enc, the message bits are first
divided into multiples of r-bit tuples, then modulation is performed on these r-bit tuples.
Ciphertext is subsequently generated by multiplying each of the in-phase and quadrature
portion of the modulated symbol with one binary valued {1,−1} key keystream bit.
In this section, we use mathematical formulations to illustrate XOR-Enc and P-Enc
using different passband modulations. Based on our model, we further analyze and compare
XOR-Enc and P-Enc in terms of security, encryption efficiency and hardware complexity.
We define the encryption efficiency to be the ratio of the ciphertext bits to the required
keystream bits, the higher the ratio, the higher the encryption efficiency.
ASK Modulation
Let fc be the carrier frequency, p(t) be the pulse shape and denote the amplitude spacing
to be 2a, then the M-ary ASK modulated passband signal s(t) at time t has the form:
s(t) = Ap(t) cos(2pifct), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
where A = −(M − 1)a,−(M − 3)a, · · · , (M − 3)a, (M − 1)a.
Let QASK(xi) be a function that maps i-th symbol xi to one of the M amplitudes using
ASK modulation, ki and k
′
i represent keystreams used for encrypting i-th symbol in XOR-
Enc and P-Enc respectively, then we can model the i-th modulated ciphertext symbol ci
and c′i with XOR-Enc and P-Enc respectively by:
ci(t) = QASK(mi + ki)p(t) cos(2pifct), (6.1)
c′i(t) = k
′
iQASK(mi)p(t) cos(2pifct). (6.2)
Here 0 ≤ t ≤ T , mi,ki ∈ Fr2 and k′i ∈ {1,−1}.
Comparing (6.1) and (6.2), we observe in XOR-Enc, ciphertext mi + ki takes on the
same space as message mi. Therefore, the modulated ciphertext symbol could lie on any
one of the valid signal constellations. However, this is not the case for P-Enc. Encryption
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in P-Enc is achieved by changing the sign of the amplitude of the modulated message
symbol. The magnitude of the amplitude remains unchanged. Another interpretation of
this is that the encryption is performed by a potential phase shift of 0 or pi between the
modulated message and ciphertext symbols.
From (6.1) and (6.2), we observe that with XOR-Enc, if message m contains N symbols
(rN bits), then the total keystream size is rN bits. This number is reduced to N bits
using P-Enc. Equivalently, the encryption efficiency for XOR-Enc and P-Enc are 1 and r
respectively. The minimum value of r = 1 is for binary ASK modulation. Consequently, P-
Enc would always require smaller or equal amount of keystreams for M-ary ASK modulated
systems. In general, the keystream size is reduced by a factor of r using P-Enc compared
to XOR-Enc in a ASK modulated communication system.
If the adversary performs random guessing on the received ciphertext symbols, then his
successful probability for recovering message m with XOR-Enc Psuc,ASK−XOR and P-Enc
Psuc,ASK−P are respectively:
Psuc,ASK−XOR =
1
2rN
,
Psuc,ASK−P =
1
2N
.
PSK Modulation
Let fc be the carrier frequency, θ be the message symbol represented in phase, then the
M-ary PSK modulated passband signal s(t) has the form:
s(t) = cos(2pifct+ θ
2pi
M
), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where θ = 0, 1, · · · , (M − 1).
Now, let QPSK(xi) be a function that maps i-th symbol xi to one of the M phases,
again ki and k
′
i denote keystreams used for encrypting i-th symbol in XOR-Enc and P-Enc
respectively, and g(mi, k
′
i) be the phase shift of i-th symbol using P-Enc with keystream
k′i, then we can model the i-th modulated ciphertext symbol ci and c
′
i with XOR-Enc and
P-Enc respectively by:
ci(t) = cos(2pifct+QPSK(mi + ki)
2pi
M
), (6.3)
c′i(t) = cos(2pifct+QPSK(mi)
2pi
M
+ g(mi, k
′
i)). (6.4)
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Here 0 ≤ t ≤ T , mi,ki ∈ Fr2, and k′i is an integer between 0 and 3. k′i can be generated
using two bits of keystream.
Comparing (6.3) and (6.4), we observe in XOR-Enc, similar to ASK modulation, ci-
phertext mi + ki takes on the same space as message mi. Therefore, the phase offset
between the modulated message and ciphertext symbols is 2pil
M
, where l = 1, · · · ,M − 1.
Recall that P-Enc is performed by multiplying each of real and quadrature components
of the modulated symbol by a {-1, 1} valued keystream, then the modulated ciphertext
symbol using P-Enc only takes on four phase values which lies in four different quadrants
and it is determined by the four keystreams. Without loss of generality, we denote the
phase that lies in the first quadrant as p0, then the other three phase values are pi − p0,
pi + p0 and 2pi − p0.
Remark: If the M-ary PSK signal constellation is not symmetrical along both the x-
axis and y-axis, as it is the case when M is odd, then there exists an attack. When M
is odd, the signal constellation is symmetrical only along one of x or y axis. Therefore,
only two out of all four phases of the modulated ciphertext symbol lie in the valid signal
constellation, the adversary can identify and remove those that are not belong to the signal
constellation. Therefore, the searching space is reduced by half. This attack only exists
when M is odd. In practise, r = log2M , or M = 2
r. In this case, M is always even and
all four phases of the modulated ciphertext lie in the valid signal constellation. Therefore,
this attack is not applicable in practise.
In general, r is an integer greater than or equal to 2. Thus, in terms of the required
keystream size, if message m contains N symbols, then the total required keystream size
is rN for XOR-Enc. This number becomes 2N for P-Enc. Equivalently, the encryption
efficiency for XOR-Enc and P-Enc are 1 and r
2
respectively. The required keystreams for P-
Enc would always be smaller than or equal to that of XOR-Enc. In general, the keystream
size is reduced by a factor of 2
r
using P-Enc compared to XOR-Enc in a PSK modulated
communication system.
Remark: If Binary PSK (BPSK) modulation is used, then r = 1 and the modulated
symbol only contains the in-phase signal (real valued). This is identical to binary ASK.
Thus we only perform encryption on the real part of the modulated symbol. Consequent-
ly, the number of keystreams required for XOR-Enc and P-Enc are still identical. In
conclusion, P-Enc would always require smaller or equal amount of keystreams for PSK
modulated systems.
If the adversary performs random guessing on the received ciphertext symbols, exclud-
ing the BPSK case, then his successful probability for recovering message m with XOR-Enc
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Psuc,PSK−XOR and P-Enc Psuc,PSK−P are respectively:
Psuc,PSK−XOR =
1
2rN
,
Psuc,PSK−P =
1
22N
.
If BPSK modulation is used, Psuc,BSPK−XOR has the same form as ASK modulation, name-
ly,
Psuc,BSPK−P =
1
2N
.
QAM Modulation
Let fc be the carrier frequency, Al be the symbol amplitude and θl be the phase, then the
M-ary QAM modulated passband signal s(t) has the form:
s(t) = Al cos(2pifct+ θl), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where l = 1, 2, · · · ,M . Unlike ASK and PSK modulations where the modulation is per-
formed either on the amplitude or the phase, QAM modulates message using both the
amplitude and phase. Note that the values of amplitude Al and phase θl depend on the
type of the employed QAM.
Now, let QQAM(xi) be a function that maps i-th symbol xi to one of the M sym-
bols using QAM modulation which contains a amplitude of |QQAM(xi)| and a phase of
∠QQAM(xi), let ki and k′i represent keystreams used for encrypting i-th symbol in XOR-
Enc and P-Enc respectively, and g(mi, k
′
i) be the phase shift of i-th symbol using P-Enc
with keystream k′i, then we can model the i-th modulated ciphertext symbol ci and c
′
i with
XOR-Enc and P-Enc respectively by:
ci(t) = |QQAM(mi + ki)| cos(2pifct+
∠QQAM(mi + ki)), (6.5)
c′i(t) = |QQAM(mi)| cos(2pifct+ ∠QQAM(mi) +
g(mi, k
′
i)). (6.6)
Here 0 ≤ t ≤ T , mi,ki ∈ Fr2, and k′i is an integer between 0 and 3. k′i can be generated
using two bits of keystream.
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Comparing (6.5) and (6.6), we see for XOR-Enc, the modulated ciphertext symbol space
is identical to the modulated message symbol space. Therefore, the modulated ciphertext
symbol could be lie on any one of the valid signal constellations.
However, encryption using P-Enc is achieved by only changing the phase of the modu-
lated message symbol, the amplitude remains unchanged. For P-Enc in QAM modulation,
modulated ciphertext symbol also takes on four phase values and these four phase values
are identical to PSK modulation. Using the same notation as PSK modulation, these four
phase values are p0, pi − p0, pi + p0 and 2pi − p0.
Remark: Note that for M-ary QAM, signal constellation is always symmetrical along
the x-axis and y-axis. The modulated ciphertext symbols of all four phases are also a
valid modulated message symbol. Therefore, the attack described previously for PSK
modulation is not applicable here.
In terms of the required keystream size, if the message m contains N symbols, then
for XOR-Enc, the total keystream size is rN . This number becomes 2N for P-Enc. E-
quivalently, the encryption efficiency for XOR-Enc and P-Enc are 1 and r
2
respectively. In
general, the keystream size is reduced by a factor of 2
r
using P-Enc compared to XOR-Enc
in a QAM modulated communication system.
If the adversary performs random guessing on the received ciphertext symbols, then his
successful probability for recovering message m with XOR-Enc Psuc,QAM−XOR and P-Enc
Psuc,QAM−P are identical to the PSK case, namely:
Psuc,QAM−XOR =
1
2rN
,
Psuc,QAM−P =
1
22N
.
FSK Modulation
P-Enc used under our context cannot be applied to FSK modulation. The reason is that the
message bearer is the carrier itself. Therefore, applying P-Enc on the modulated symbol
with the keystream will not hide the information. The fact that there has been a signal
transmitted on that carrier is still revealed to the adversary. Thus he can demodulate and
decode the symbol back to the message bits.
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Summary
In the previous section, we have shown the mathematical formulations for XOR-Enc and
P-Enc using three passband modulations, namely ASK, PSK and QAM modulations. Since
XOR-Enc is performed prior to the modulation, we observe the required keystream size for
XOR-Enc is independent of the modulation methods. However this is not the case with
P-Enc. The required keystreams depend on the modulated symbols as P-Enc is performed
after the modulation. In the case of ASK modulation where the modulated symbol is real
valued, only one keystream bit is required to encrypted one modulated symbol. In PSK
and QAM modulations, the modulated symbol is in general complex valued. Therefore,
two keystream bits are required to encrypt one modulated symbol, one bit for the in-phase
component and one bit for the quadrature component of the modulated symbol. The only
exception is BPSK modulation. Modulated BPSK symbol is also real valued. Therefore,
only one bit keystream is needed for encryption. Finally, we have concluded P-Enc cannot
be applied to FSK modulated system.
In terms of security, if the adversary adopts the random guessing approach, then his
successful probability for ASK, PSK and QAM modulations are summarized and listed in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Random Guessing Successful Probability Comparisons between XOR-Enc and
P-Enc
Modulations XOR-Enc P-Enc
ASK Psuc =
1
2rN
Psuc =
1
2N
PSK Psuc =
1
2rN
Psuc =
1
22N
QAM Psuc =
1
2rN
Psuc =
1
22N
From this table, we observe that XOR-Enc has a lower random successful random
guessing probability than P-Enc. This is expected due to the increased keystream size.
However, if the number of transmitted symbols N are sufficiently large. i.e., N ≥ 128,
then from the random guessing point of view, the reduced key size do not compromise the
security of the underlying communication system.
6.2.3 Hardware Complexity
In this section, we compare the hardware complexity between XOR-Enc and P-Enc in
terms of the gate equivalent (GE) measurement, where one GE refers to the area of a
2-input NAND gate.
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In general, each XOR gate is composed of 4 GEs. A 2-input 1-output 1-bit multiplexer
can be constructed using 4 GEs. One NOT gate can be implemented using 1 GE. A 1-bit
2’s complement can be implemented using 5 GEs (1 GE for the compliment and 4GEs for
the carry).
For XOR-Enc, the number of bits per symbol is r, where r = log2M . Therefore, A
total of 4r GEs are required to encrypt one symbol.
For P-Enc, if the keystream bit is 1, then the modulated ciphertext symbol remains
identical to the modulated message symbol. Otherwise, 1 is added to the 2’s complement of
the modulated message symbol to create the modulated ciphertext symbol. Consequently,
the phase is shifted by 180◦. We use the most straight forward implementation method to
implement this. We use a multiplexer with one bit keystream act as a ‘select’ to determine
the phase of the modulated symbol. Suppose each modulated symbol is quantized using l
bits, if the modulated symbol is real valued, then P-Enc requires 4l GEs for the multiplexer,
l GEs for the compliment and 4l GEs for the carry. This sums to a total of 9l GEs. If
the modulated symbol is complex valued, then the hardware complexity is doubled to 18l
GEs.
In practise, the typical ranges of l and r are between 8 − 14 and 2 − 8 respectively.
Therefore, we expect a higher hardware complexity with P-Enc.
6.3 Performance Analysis between XOR-Enc and P-
Enc
In this section, we first explain how PHY layer P-Enc can prevent traffic analysis attack.
Then we compare P-Enc and XOR-Enc at the system level by taking into account the
effect of channel coding.
6.3.1 PHY Layer P-Enc for Combating Traffic Analysis Attack
As described in Chapter 2, the security functionalities of LTE E-UTRAN are implemented
in the PDCP layer. The confidentiality of message contents is kept secure at this layer.
Layer headers and other information which are added afterwards are not encrypted. They
can be easily captured, and consequently revealed in plaintext to the adversary. These
include the PDCP, RLC, MAC headers and MAC control elements along with the optional
padding in the MAC layer. Please refer to Figure 2.2 for details.
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For instance, in the MAC layer, a MAC PDU contains a MAC header, zero or more
MAC control elements, zero or more MAC SDUs and optional paddings. One MAC header
is consisted of one or multiple MAC PDU sub-headers, each sub-header corresponds to
a MAC SDU, which contains the length of SDU in bytes and the value of LCID used
to differentiate the logic channels for uplink and downlink. The control elements include
instructions such as timing advance command, contention resolution identity and/or power
headroom, etc [2]. The MAC header, control elements and paddings are not protected as
they are sent in plaintext over the wireless channel. Thus, the adversary can conduct traffic
analysis and recover these relevant information.
Moreover, we want to emphasize that MAC header in 802.11 contain the MAC address
of the transmitting and receiving devices [49]. By conducting traffic analysis, the identities
of the two communicating parties are immediately revealed!
Traffic analysis attack can be prevented by employing encryption functions in the lowest
(PHY) layer in the network protocol stack. That is if the data contents are encrypted just
before the transmission, with no additional unprotected information being added, then the
adversary cannot gain any useful information by analyzing the intercepted signals. This is
exactly the case with PHY layer P-Enc. From Figure 6.6, we observe that the encryption is
taking place immediately prior to the DAC conversion and radio transmission, no additional
unprotected information are added which would result in the information leakage.
Remark: Note that XOR-Enc in the PHY layer would also prevent traffic analysis
attack if there is no additional unprotected information being added to the packets before
the transmission. Therefore, both XOR-Enc and P-Enc can thwart traffic analysis attack
when performed at the PHY layer.
6.3.2 P-Enc vs XOR-Enc at the System Level
In the previous section, we have only considered encryption and modulation blocks for
XOR-Enc and P-Enc. In this section, we analyze and compare XOR-Enc and P-Enc in
terms of efficiency and security at the system level by taking into consideration of channel
coding.
The system level XOR-Enc and P-Enc are shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 respectively.
On a system level, P-Enc still take place immediately after the modulation block, while
XOR-Enc can take place in one of two places, either in block A or block B as shown
in Figure 6.5, both are prior to the modulation block. We now discuss these two cases
separately.
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Figure 6.6: PHY Layer P-Enc in a Communication System
Encryption before Channel Coding: The encryption is taking place inside block
A. Most communication systems adopt this order for conducting encryption and channel
coding. The reason is that channel coding introduces redundancies, the resulting code-
words are expanded in length from the original message. For instance, the channel coding
in LTE has specified different coding rates [6]. Suppose turbo code with a rate of 1
3
is
used, the length of the message is increased by a factor of 3 due to channel coding. There-
fore, performing encryptions after the channel coding would triple the amount of required
keystreams. Thus, the encryption efficiency is reduced.
However, depending on the modulation rate, P-Enc may still have a higher encryption
efficiency than XOR-Enc even if the encryption efficiency is reduced due to channel coding.
This occurs when modulation and coding rates are high. For example, in the 802.11ac stan-
dard, when 256 QAM modulation and 5
6
channel coding rate is employed [49], 6 keystream
bits are required to encrypt one modulated message symbol using XOR-Enc. On average,
this number is reduced to 12
5
bits with P-Enc. In this case, P-Enc still holds an advantage
over XOR-Enc in terms of encryption efficiency.
Encryption after Channel Coding: The encryption is taking place inside block
B. This can occur when the source coding and the channel coding are jointly encoded and
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decoded [37]. In this case, both XOR-Enc and P-Enc are performed after channel coding.
Therefore, the channel coding would not have an impact on the encryption efficiency as
it did in the previous case. Consequently, P-Enc would always have an equal or higher
encryption efficiency than XOR-Enc. In the worst case, the two encryption schemes would
result in the identical required keystream size. For higher rate modulations, i.e., r > 2,
P-Enc would always require less keystreams which results in a higher encryption efficiency.
In terms of security, from the random guessing point of view, if the same amount of
keystreams are used, then the security level is identical between P-Enc and XOR-Enc.
If P-Enc uses less keystreams as it is the case with high modulation and channel coding
rate, then the efficiency is increased at the expense of some reduced security level. On
the other hand, if the P-Enc uses more keystreams as it is the case with lower modulation
and channel coding rate, then the security level is increased at the expense of reduced
encryption efficiency. Overall, there exists a tradeoff between the security level and the
encryption efficiency.
6.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we conduct simulations to compare P-Enc and XOR-Enc. Our simulations
include three modulation schemes. They are ASK, PSK and QAM modulations. Moreover,
in the simulation, we assume the channel is corrupted by the AWGN. For each modulation,
we compare the decoding SER as a function SNR. Furthermore, we pick two constellation
sizes, M = 4 and M = 16. Therefore, each modulated symbol contains r = 2 and r = 4 bits
respectively. Finally, SER is computed over 105 modulated symbols for each modulation.
The SER plot as a function of SNR for M = 4 is shown in Figure 6.7. When M = 4,
the signal constellation between PSK and QAM modulations are identical. Thus, their
decoding SER is expected to be identical. This has precisely been reflected in the figure.
Moreover, with identical average transmitted power, 4PSK should have a lower SER than
4ASK. This has also been observed in the figure. Finally, we observe in all 3 modulations,
P-Enc has a slightly lower SER than XOR-Enc.
The SER plot as a function of SNR for M = 16 is shown in Figure 6.8. We observe
between the three modulations, QAM modulation has the lowest SER, followed by P-
SK modulation, ASK modulation has the worst SER. This agrees with the theory [113].
Moreover, once again we have P-Enc yields a slightly smaller SER than XOR-Enc.
From these two simulations, we have observed P-Enc has a better performance in terms
of the lower decoding SER than XOR-Enc.
66
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
SNR(dB)
SE
R
 
 
4−ary ASK XOR−Enc
4−ary ASK P−Enc
4−ary PSK XOR−Enc
4−ary PSK P−Enc
4−ary QAM XOR−Enc
4−ary QAM P−Enc
Figure 6.7: SER vs SNR for M = 4
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have extended the use of P-Enc to general communication systems.
This include ASK, PSK and QAM modulated systems but not FSK modulated system.
Then we have formulated mathematical models in order to analyze and compare XOR-Enc
and P-Enc. Using the mathematical formulations, we compared the security, encryption
efficiency and hardware complexity between these two encryption methods. We also showed
P-Enc at the PHY layer can resist traffic analysis attack. In addition, we have compared
XOR-Enc and P-Enc at the system level when taking into considerations of channel coding.
Finally, we have conducted two simulations to compare the performance of XOR-Enc and
P-Enc in terms of the decoding SER. From both simulations, we have observed P-Enc has
a slightly lower SER than XOR-Enc.
The overall comparisons between XOR-Enc and P-Enc is summarized and listed in
Table 6.2. In general, P-Enc provides an alternative to XOR-Enc.
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Table 6.2: XOR-Enc and P-Enc Comparisons
XOR-Enc P-Enc
Keystream Size rN N or 2N
Resistance to Traffic Analysis Yes Yes
SER Pe,XOR−Enc > Pe,P−Enc
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Part III
PHY Layer RFID Confidentiality
Protection Scheme
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Chapter 7
VRTA-An Novel Approach to Ensure
Tag to Reader Data Confidentiality
in RFID
In this chapter, we propose a physical layer approach by Varying Transmitted Amplitude
(VRTA), to ensure the tag to reader data confidentiality protection in RFID systems. As
discussed in Chapter 3, due to the cost constraints for majority of RFID applications,
most applications adopt the passive RFID system. In a passive RFID system, the tag
has no on-board battery, it needs to harvest power from the reader. Moreover, it has
very limited computational power and storage capacity. Each tag adheres to a minimalist
design. Therefore, standard cryptographic primitives cannot be implemented to these
tags to ensure the security and the privacy of the RFID system. For example, in the
most widely used EPC Class1 Gen2 standard [28], the communication session between the
reader and the tag’s replies are sent in plaintext. Due to the nature of wireless channels,
the open communication is susceptible to eavesdropping. The tag’s ID and contents are
easily compromised and recovered by the attacker.
The most straight-forward prevention method would be to encrypt the messages trans-
mitted from the reader to the tag. This is accomplished by pre-sharing a key between
the reader and the tag. However, this requires extra resources and effort to set up a key
management and distribution system. Moreover, the tag needs to have sufficient storage
capacity to store the key and to add extra hardware to implement an encryption primitive
to generate keystreams from the pre-shared key. It can incur a higher cost for the tag and
hinder the performance of the system.
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Motivated by the increasing concerns over the privacy issue of RFID systems, we con-
sider the problem of keeping tag’s data and its replied messages to the reader secure in
the presence of the eavesdropper. More specifically, we are interested in: 1) How to secure
data transmission when tags have only very limited computation capability and storage
capacity? 2) How to exchange keys without secret sharing in advance while using limited
computation resources?
To address these questions, we have come up with a PHY layer solution to provide
the data confidentiality protection in the presence of passive eavesdroppers. Our solution
requires no pre-sharing of the key and modifications to the tag, while still ensuring the
tag’s data and location privacies. The main focuses of this chapter are summarized and
listed below:
• VRTA system design: We propose a PHY layer stand-alone system called VRTA.
It provides data confidentiality protection to passive RFID systems against passive
eavesdroppers. In our system, the reader generates and transmits a random time
varying amplitude waveform. This waveform can be successfully removed by the
legitimate reader and is seen as interference in the view of the attacker. Hence, the
reader and tag do not require pre-shared secrets for securing the communication. In
addition, the VRTA system utilizes only one transmitter and can be applied to all
current commercial readers.
• Optimal system design parameters: We conduct theoretical analysis by consid-
ering the optimal strategy for the malicious adversaries. We show theoretically with
the proper selection of system parameters, our scheme is resistant to our adversarial
models.
• VRTA system implementation and performance: We implement the VRTA
prototype using software define radio N210 and USRP1 [103] acting as readers, and
Intel WISP tag [111] acting as the passive RFID tag. We verify our system perfor-
mance through experiments.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 7.1, we present the relat-
ed work. In Section 7.2, we describe the system and adversarial models. In Section 7.3,
we present the VRTA framework. In Section 7.4, we conduct theoretical analysis on our
scheme. In Section 7.5 and 7.6, we present the secure transmission protocol of our VR-
TA framework and verify its performance through USRP implementations. We show the
decoding bit error rate (BER) for both the legitimate reader and malicious eavesdropper.
In Section 7.7, we propose the use of VRTA in the EPC Class1 Gen2 standard for data
confidentiality protection. Section 7.8 concludes our work.
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7.1 Related Work
Using the conventional crypto primitives to ensure the privacy RFID systems requires the
tag to be very powerful [35, 46]. This may be accomplished with more sophisticated and
expensive active RFID tags, but it is very challenging with power and memory constrained
passive tags [61, 80]. Moreover, the low computational capability of passive tags make key
exchanges and establishment using Diffie-Hellman approaches [101, 26] and other public-
key-based methods [58, 107] almost impossible to implement. Some existing lightwight key
exchange protocols have been proposed in [15, 69, 8]. However, these protocols require
pre-sharing of the secret between the reader and the tag. Moreover, there have also been
attacks reported that if the malicious adversary is able to observe the communication
between the reader and tag for a prolonged period of the time, then it is possible to
recover the session key [10, 70]. Thus, the security of the pre-shared secret may also be
compromised. Therefore, by applying cryptography approach alone to securing the RFID
system for resource constrained passive tags might not be sufficient.
Frequency hopping is one popular approach used in the PHY layer to ensure the sys-
tem security in wireless communication systems [97, 89]. Although frequency hopping can
mitigate the passive eavesdropping attack by randomly and continuously changing its cen-
tral carrier frequency, it contains two major drawbacks: 1) It potentially occupies a wider
frequency spectrum, so the spectrum efficiency is decreased. 2) It can limit the tag’s data
rate [91]. Direct sequence spread spectrum [114] has also been investigated. However, it
has the similar drawbacks as frequency hopping.
Using self jamming to secure RFID systems has been proposed recently in [93, 8, 93],
a jamming (noise) signal is broadcasted by a separate transmitting antenna along with
reader’s CW. The legitimate reader can successfully remove the jamming signal while the
malicious adversary cannot. Thus, the eavesdropper receives a degraded signal, which
hinders his ability to perform decoding. Although the authors have claimed that the
random noise is able to thwart an eavesdropper, no theoretical analysis as well as system
design parameters are given. The blocker tag method in [61] is very similar to the jamming
method. The blocker tag simulates the serial number of all tags in the system, preventing
the adversary from reading in real time. This method can be thought as a kind of passive
jamming.
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Figure 7.1: RFID System Composed of Back-end Database, Readers and Tags.
7.2 System and Adversarial Models
In this section, we introduce the system and adversarial models as well as the assumptions
our work is based on.
7.2.1 System Model
We consider the most common passive RFID system which is consisted of three components:
A back-end database, one or multiple readers and one or multiple passive RFID tags as
shown in Figure 8.1. The connection from the reader to the database is assumed through
the secure channel. The communication between readers and tags are through insecure
wireless channels. Since one reader can only communicate with one tag at a time, and the
communication between a tag and a reader is independently secured, the system model of
our interest can be reduced to one reader and one passive tag.
The reader is assumed to be full-duplex. At the baseband, the reader can generate N
equally spaced levels of amplitude from A0 to AN−1. We define the step size ∆A to be the
difference between two consecutive amplitudes. i.e., ∆A = Ak+1−Ak for k = 0, · · · , N−2.
Each time, the reader randomly chooses among the N levels of amplitude for transmission.
Furthermore, each amplitude duration is T .
The passive RFID tag communicates with the reader via backscattering modulation.
We denote the gain coefficient when the tag sets its impedance to high (bit 0) and low (bit
1) to be η0 and η1 respectively. The tag’s symbol time is Ts.
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7.2.2 Adversarial Model
In our adversarial model, the adversaries are passive eavesdroppers whose goal is to deduce
the data contents transmitted from the tag to the reader.
We first consider the single passive eavesdropper case. The eavesdropper can listen
to and intercept the communication between the reader and the tag. In addition, the
eavesdropper is assumed to be mobile. He can freely move around or stay put as he
chooses. He also has the complete knowledge of all the protocols and frequencies used for
communications between the reader and the tag. Moreover, we assume while the adversary
has the knowledge about the time varying nature of the reader’s transmitted waveform,
he does not have the specific values chosen for the “random” amplitude at any given time.
However, the adversary knows the minimum amplitude A0, maximum amplitude AN−1,
the number of steps N and step size ∆A. In other words, the adversary has full knowledge
of the system design parameters. We further assume the tag’s reflection coefficient η0,
η1, as well as all channel gains including reader to tag, tag to eavesdropper, reader to
eavesdropper are known to the eavesdropper. In this case, the eavesdropper is rather
powerful. In practise, it would be very difficult to obtain the impedance gain coefficients
and channel gains. Nevertheless, if our designed system can withstand this adversarial
model, we can conclude our system can withstand all the weaker adversarial models.
We then test our system by considering two colluding eavesdroppers. In addition to
the single eavesdropper’s assumptions, we further assume the two eavesdroppers’ received
signals are perfectly synchronized, implying that there would be no relative delays between
the two received signals. Finally, we generalize our framework to an arbitrary number of
eavesdroppers.
7.3 VRTA Scheme
In this section, we present the high level overview of our proposed scheme. We also show
the decoding procedure for the legitimate reader.
7.3.1 Model Formulation
The total input amplitude range is divided into N equally spaced steps. The minimum and
maximum reader’s transmitted amplitudes are A0 and AN−1 respectively. This is shown
in Figure 7.2. In the VRTA scheme, ∆A and N are our system design parameters. The
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Figure 7.2: N Input Amplitude Levels Shown in Baseband.
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Figure 7.3: System Diagram with One Eavesdropper
minimum amplitude A0 and the maximum amplitude AN−1 are chosen to satisfy certain
criteria which we will discuss in Section 7.5.
When the tag starts replying to the reader’s query, the reader instead of transmitting
a constant amplitude CW as the current approach does, it uniformly and randomly selects
one of the N amplitude levels from A0 to AN−1 and transmits that amplitude to the tag
for a predefined time duration T . In the subsequent time durations, the reader repeats
this process till the end of the communication session.
The system model with one present eavesdropper is depicted in Figure 7.3. hrt, htr,
hte, hre and hrr denote channel gains of reader’s Tx to tag, tag to reader’s Rx, tag to
eavesdropper, reader’s Tx to eavesdropper and reader’s Tx to its Rx respectively.
We now formulate the mathematical expressions for the communication between the
reader and tag as well as the eavesdropper’s intercepted signals. Let fti, gti, rti and
mti be the reader’s transmitted signal, tag’s replied signal, reader’s received signal and
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eavesdropper’s intercepted signal respectively at time instance i, we have:
fti = Ati,
gti = hrt(ηriAti),
rti = hrrAti + hrthtr(ηriAti), (7.1)
mti = hreAti + hrthte(ηriAti). (7.2)
where ti ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}, ηri is the tag’s reflection coefficient for bit 0 and 1 at time i,
and ri ∈ {0, 1} .
7.3.2 Reader Decoding
At any given time instance i, the reader’s received signal rti would be the sum of reader’s
time varying amplitude and the tag’s reflection coefficient η0 or η1 with the proper channel
gain adjustments. When the reader performs decoding, since it can estimate the channel
response hrr from the synchronization sequence which we will discuss in the protocol design
section, we assume hrr is known to the reader’s Rx. Moreover, it knows the input waveform
Ati for all i, by observing (7.1), the reader can successfully remove the interference term
hrrAti and obtain sti.
sti =
rti
hrr
− Ati
=
hrthtrηriAti
hrr
.
Suppose the length of the tag’s reply contains M bits, the obtained waveforms after re-
moving the interference becomes s = (st0, · · · st(M−1)). The magnitude of each element in s
should be close to one of two levels, hrthtrη0A¯
hrr
or hrthtrη1A¯
hrr
, corresponding to tag’s reply of bit
0 or 1. A¯ = A0+AN−1
2
is the middle point of the input amplitude and hrthtrη1A¯
hrr
>> hrthtrη0A¯
hrr
.
Then the reader’s decoding procedure is as follows:
1. Define two sets A0 and A1, where A0 = {sti|sti ≈ hrthtrη0A¯hrr } and A1 = {sti|sti ≈
hrthtrη1A¯
hrr
}.
2. Find a0, a1, where a0 =
∑
sti∈A0 sti
#A0 and a1 =
∑
sti∈A1 sti
#A1 are the average of low and
high level signals respectively. Here # denotes the cardinality of the set.
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3. The reader decodes the message bit yi at time instance i with the following decision
rule:
yi =
{
0, sti ≤ 12(a1 + a0),
1, otherwise.
(7.3)
7.4 Security Analysis and Optimal System Parame-
ters Design
In this section, we first discuss the reader’s amplitude duration T relative to tag’s symbol
time Ts. Then we consider the single eavesdropper’s attacking strategy. From this, we
deduce the optimal system design parameters. In addition, we show the VRTA scheme
utilizing these parameters can withstand one eavesdropper. Finally, we consider the two
colluding eavesdroppers scenario.
7.4.1 Selection of T and Ts
In our scheme, we require the tag’s symbol time Ts to be an integer multiple of reader’s
time duration T . Equivalently, the amplitude varying rate should be an integer multiple
of tag’s data rate. If this condition is not met, the eavesdropper can perform differential
decoding to recover the message bits. This is demonstrated in Figure 7.4.
The black solid line in the figure represents the reader’s varying amplitude. In the
absence of the noise, the red dotted line is the eavesdropper’s received signals with tag’s
replies. Since the eavesdropper is assumed to know tag’s symbol time Ts, the starting
point of the varying amplitude and its duration T , if Ts is not an integer multiple of T , i.e.,
Ts 6= kT , where k is an positive integer, then the eavesdropper can find some amplitude
duration such that the tags response switch from bit 1 to bit 0 or from bit 0 to 1.
In this example, the tag’s actual reply is (0,1,0,1). The eavesdropper observes a sudden
change in the received signal level at Ts, which is less than the reader’s amplitude duration
T , he immediately identifies the tag’s first 2 bits reply are (0,1).
In general, let ∆r be the average difference in amplitude between the tag’s reply of 0
and 1, the eavesdropper decodes the tag’s response yi+1 from its two consecutive received
data st(i+1) and sti, and then perform the differential decoding:
yi+1 =
{
yi, st(i+1) − sti ≤ 12∆r,
1− yi, Otherwise.
(7.4)
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Figure 7.4: Attack When Ts 6= kT .
If initially the tags response does not change, the eavesdropper cannot immediate recover
those bits. However, as soon as tag’s reply flips, regardless from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0,
the eavesdropper can immediate recover these two bits, and consequently recovering all
preceding and succeeding message bits.
In addition, if the input amplitude A0 or AN−1 is transmitted, the eavesdropper has
a better chance of recovering the tag’s reply. The reasons is that when reader sends A0
or AN−1, since the eavesdropper has the knowledge of the channel gain as well as A0 and
AN−1, then he can distinguish the tag’s reply of 0 when A0 is transmitted and reply of 1
when AN−1 is transmitted by examining the amplitude level of the received signal.
7.4.2 Single Eavesdropper
In this section, we show two potential attacks which can be employed by the eavesdropper
as well as the corresponding system parameter selections to mitigate these two attacks.
From (7.2), the eavesdropper’s received signal at a given time i is:
mti = hreAti + hrthte(ηriAti).
Here hrthte(ηriAti) contains tag’s replied bit information while hreAti is seen as the inter-
ference. The eavesdropper can potentially launch two attacks.
Attack 1: hrthte(η1Ak+1 − η0Ak) < hre(Ak+1 − Ak), where k = 0, · · · , N − 2.
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Figure 7.5: Attacking Scenario 1
Since all steps are equally spaced, we have ∆A = Ak+1−Ak. Furthermore, tag’s backscat-
tered signal of 1 is much greater than 0, i.e., η1 >> η0, by choosing A0 >> ∆A, we can
approximate the condition for case 1 as follows:
hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯) < hre(∆A),
where A¯ = AN−1+A0
2
is the middle point of the input amplitude range.
Note that the identical attack still exists without the approximation. The only differ-
ence is that the decision region for decoding may be slightly different for different initial
input amplitudes. Writing out all N decision regions for N different amplitudes are re-
dundant and would not affect the outcome of the attack. Thus the approximation is used.
The same is true for the attack case 2.
In this attack, the difference of two consecutive amplitudes is greater than the difference
between tag’s replied messages 0 and 1. This is pictorially shown in Figure 7.5. This
implies the interference step is too great that the eavesdropper can immediately identify
the interference level hreAti. Thus at time instance i, the eavesdropper simply decodes the
received bit yi as follows:
yi =
{
0, (mti − hreAti) ≤ 12hrthte(η1A¯+ η0A¯),
1, Otherwise.
(7.5)
Therefore, to prevent the attack case 1, the following condition should be satisfied.
∆A ≤ hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯)
hre
, (7.6)
∆A in (7.6) determines the upper bound on the chosen step size to ensure a secure system.
Attack 2: hrthte(η1A
′
k+1 − η0A′k) > 2hre(A′k+1 − A′k), where k = 0, · · · , L− 2. We have
defined a new set of partitions for the input amplitudes which has a total of L steps. We
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Figure 7.6: Attacking Scenario 2
denote the new step size ∆A′ = A′k+1 − A′k. Using the same argument, we approximate
the condition as
hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯) > 2hre(∆A′).
This is shown pictorially in Figure 7.6. This case implies the tag’s replied signal is much
stronger than the step size ∆A′ when taking into considerations of the channel gain. The
eavesdropper picks two intervals mti and mtj satisfying |mti −mtj| < |hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯)|.
If the input A′ti and A
′
tj that corresponds to output mti and mtj is separated by less than
or equal to the step size, i.e., |A′ti − A′tj| ≤ ∆A′, then the eavesdropper can identify the
tag’s replied 2-bit tuple as follows:
(yi, yj) =

(1, 0) , mti −mtj > 12hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯),
(0, 0)or(1, 1), |mti −mtj| ≤ 12hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯),
(0, 1) , mti −mtj < −12hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯).
We see that half of the time the eavesdropper would be able to uniquely decode the 2-bit
tuple. For the case where the eavesdropper cannot tell whether it’s (0,0) or (1,1), he can
maintain one of mti or mtj and choose another interval mtk that satisfies the constraint
and repeat the same decoding procedure. The eavesdropper does this repeatedly until he
is able to decode. Once the eavesdropper can decode one 2-bit tuple, he can then uniquely
decode all the bits taken previously.
Therefore, to best prevent this attack, the following condition should be satisfied.
∆A′ ≥ hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯)
2hre
, (7.7)
∆A′ in (7.7) determines the lower bound on the chosen step size.
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Based on the conditions drawn from (7.6) and (7.7), we conclude our design parameter
∆A should be within the interval shown as follows:
hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯)
2hre
≤ ∆A ≤ hrthte(η1A¯− η0A¯)
hre
. (7.8)
In RFID systems where the distance between reader’s Tx and eavesdropper dre is com-
parable to the distance between tag and eavesdropper dte, then |hre| ≈ |hte|. In the
commercial readers, this condition is satisfied if the reader is placed close to the tag. Then
(7.8) reduces to:
hrt(η1A¯− η0A¯)
2
≤ ∆A ≤ hrt(η1A¯− η0A¯).
The step size becomes simple to choose. One can pick ∆A and N such that the above
equation holds. In practise, these two values may be difficult to evaluate since this requires
a good estimation of the channel conation and tag reflection coefficient. However, even
though determining ∆A and N may not be trivial, it is not impossible. References signals
can be used to measure the channel gain and tag’s reflection coefficient, from this, ∆A and
N can be determined.
The system becomes a little more difficult to design if |hre| ≈ |hte| does not hold. Since
the reader has no knowledge of the whereabouts of the eavesdropper, hre and hte are not
known. Therefore, it is not guaranteed that one can find ∆A which can always satisfy
(7.8) and consequently thwart the attack. However, here we have assumed all factors
to be ideal, in the real system with channel gain inconsistencies, non-linear channel gain
and added noise, we expect it would be very difficult for the eavesdropper to perform the
aforementioned attacks.
7.4.3 Two Eavesdroppers
In this section, we consider two colluding eavesdropper’s case. Each eavesdropper intercepts
its own set of signals independent from the other eavesdropper. The optimal strategy for
the eavesdropper is to try to cancel the interference and then perform the decoding. We first
show how this can be accomplished. Then we show the necessary condition to prevent this
attack. Finally, we generalize our prevention method to arbitrary number of eavesdroppers.
Let mti and m
′
ti be the two eavesdropper’s received signal at time i, with a tag’s response
of 0. Using the same notation, we can write mti and m
′
ti as follows:
mti = hreAti + hrthte(η0Ati),
m′ti = h
′
reAti + hrth
′
te(η0Ati).
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When the tag’s response is 0, the impedance is set to high, implying η0 ≈ 0. Therefore,
the two eavesdroppers can estimate the channel gain ratio between them as follows:
|mti|
|m′ti|
≈ |hre
h′re
|.
Suppose at time instance j, two eavesdroppers receive mtj and m
′
tj with a tag response
of 1:
mtj = hreAtj + hrthte(η1Atj),
m′tj = h
′
reAtj + hrth
′
te(η1Atj).
The two eavesdroppers try to cancel the interference as follows:
m′tj
|mti|
|m′ti|
−mtj ≈ hrtη1Atj(h′te
hre
h′re
− hte). (7.9)
hrtη1Atj(h
′
te
hre
h′re
− hte) in (7.9) represents the value for tag’s response of bit 1. A non-zero
value implies the two eavesdroppers can successfully remove the interference. Following
this, they can perform the identical decoding procedure as the legitimate reader, which is
shown in Section 7.4.2.
This attack is not successful if (7.9) is zero. This occurs when the reader is placed close
to the tag, then | hte
hre
| ≈ | h′te
h′re
|. This implies in an attempt to cancel the interference by the
two eavesdroppers, their respective channel gains cause the message contents also to be
canceled out, leaving the attack unsuccessful.
7.4.4 Extending to Multiple Eavesdroppers
Using the same argument as two eavesdroppers, VRTA can be applied to an arbitrary
number of colluding eavesdroppers. From (7.9), we observe as long as the reader is placed
close to the tag, then any pair-wise subtraction in an attempt between any two colluding
eavesdroppers to cancel the interference would not be successful. Therefore, we conclude
that by selecting the system parameters using (7.8), our VRTA scheme is secure against
an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers.
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7.5 RFID Secure Transmission Protocol
In Section 7.4.2, we have made the assumption that the reader can completely remove the
interference Ati. This requires the knowledge of channel gain hrr. In this section, we first
show how this is accomplished. Then we present our protocol to ensure tag to reader data
confidentiality.
7.5.1 Finding the Channel Gain from Reader’s Tx to Rx
In the commercial readers, the reader’s Tx and Rx are placed very close together. In this
case, |hrr| ≈ 1, |hrr| is treated as known in the view of the reader. Alternatively, if one
wants to be very accurate, or concerned with non-linear gain over different amplitudes
which we will discuss in the next section, one can always measure the channel gain and
store it in a look up table.
The benchmark waveform for channel estimation is shown in Figure 7.7. The reader
first sends out a pseudorandom (PN) sequence. This sequence is used to perform syn-
chronization between Tx and Rx to identify the start of a communication session for the
receiver. The sequence chosen is an m-sequence with length 63. The reason for choosing
m-sequence is because it has ideal 2-level autocorrelations, which is desired for receiver
synchronization [32].
After sending the PN sequence, the reader’s Tx starts sending a stair case function
which is used to measure channel gains for different input amplitudes. The reason is to
measure the non-linear gains and make the decoding less error prone. At the reader’s Rx,
it obtains the channel gain as follows:
1. The receiver synchronizes with the incoming signal by computing the correlations
between the received signal and the locally generated PN sequence.
2. Once the signal is synchronized, the receiver identifies the start of the stair case
function.
3. For each step, the receiver computes the channel gain by taking the average of the
received signals for that step and then dividing by the input amplitude.
4. Channel gains for different input amplitudes are stored in a look-up table.
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Figure 7.7: The Benchmark Waveform for Channel Gain Estimation.
Note that in most cases, this procedure needs to be applied only once, the channel gain
is obtained and stored. In the subsequent communications, the reader’s Rx immediately
reads the channel gain from the look-up table, then it performs the proper gain adjustments
to the received signals. In the rare event where the channel gain is no longer accurate, one
can always repeat this procedure to update the channel gain.
7.5.2 Secure Transmission Protocol
In this section, we explain our protocols for ensuring tag to reader data confidentiality.
Figure 7.8 shows the protocol command issued by the reader. The entire protocol works
as follows:
1. Similarly to the case of channel estimation, the reader initiates the communication
by sending the same PN sequence to the receiver for synchronization.
2. The reader sends a constant amplitude wave followed by a command. This is repeated
three times. The constant amplitude wave supplies the tag with sufficient power to
identify the command, while the three repeated commands can assist the tag in
identifying the starting point for the incoming time varying waveforms and lead to a
more robust system design.
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Figure 7.8: VRTA Protocol Composed of the PN Sequence, Three Repeated Commands
and Varying Amplitude Waveform.
3. After observing the third command, the tag starts replying to the reader. At the
same time, the reader starts sending out the time varying waveform. This waveform
provides two functions: 1) To supply the tag with sufficient power for computations
and replies via backscattering modulation. 2) To serve as interference signal to the
eavesdropper, preventing him from being able to decode.
Note that in the most accurate case, the magnitude of the backscattered response changes
slightly with different input amplitudes. This is due to the tag’s response is essentially the
input amplitude multiplied by a coefficient η0 or η1. Therefore, if the N∆A is comparable
with A0. The assumption that we can replace instantaneous Ati with the average amplitude
A¯ in Section 7.4.2 becomes invalid. This may further cause decoding errors. In addition, if
A0 is very low, then the tag may not be able to harvest sufficient power for computations
and communications. Consequently, in our input amplitude range design, we choose the
minimum and maximum amplitude to be 0.17 and 0.27 respectively.
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7.6 Experimental Results
We have implemented our scheme using the Intel WISP tag as the passive RFID tag,
and USRPs as the reader and eavesdroppers. In this section, we first describe the exper-
imental setup. Then using our design parameters, we conduct experiments to verify our
VRTA system performance with different amplitude varying frequencies and distance of the
eavesdropper from the tag. We show the decoding results for tag’s data rate of 10kbps and
reader’s amplitude varying rates of 10kHz and 20kHz. Finally, performance comparisons
are made in terms of BER among different parties and settings.
7.6.1 Experimental Setup
We use one USRP N210 with one RFX900 daughter board as the reader. The reader
uses the linear vertical directional antennas with a gain of 2dBi. The eavesdroppers are
implemented using USRP 1 with two RFX900 daughter board. The two eavesdroppers use
the circular polarized antennas with a gain of 6dBi. Thus, in our experimental settings,
the eavesdroppers are more powerful than the legitimate reader’s Rx. We use Intel WISP
tag as our passive RFID tag.
Both the eavesdropper and the reader’s sampling rate is 1MHz. Upon receiving the
third command, the tag replies a 40-bit sequence. In our experiment, the 40-bit sequence
is predefined so we can evaluate the performance of our system. Furthermore, in Section
7.5.1, we have determined the relationship between tag’s data rate Ts and the amplitude
duration T is Ts = kT , where k is an positive integer. In this experiment, since tag’s data
rate is set to 10kbps, we consider two amplitude varying rates at 10kHz and 20kHz. Or
equivalently, k = 1 and k = 2. We want to see in practise if there is any impact on the
performance of our system in terms of decoding BER by changing the amplitude varying
rates. Finally, we take ∆A = 0.005, the corresponding number of steps N = 20.
7.6.2 Single Eavesdropper Attack
In this section, we consider the single eavesdropper attack. The RFID reader, tag and the
eavesdropper’s locations are depicted in Figure 7.9. We choose the eavesdropper to be on
the opposite side of the reader. This is because the eavesdropper wants to maximize the
ratio of the received tag’s signal to reader’s time varying interference.
As our assumptions have stated, the eavesdropper has complete knowledge of the pro-
tocol. Therefore, he can perform the synchronization and identify the starting point for
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Figure 7.9: Single Eavesdropper Experiment Setup
the time varying signal. The eavesdropper’s received signals for the 10kHz and 20kHz
amplitude varying rate are shown in Figure 7.10.
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Figure 7.10: Received Signals by the Eavesdropper with 10kHz and 20kHz Varying rate.
In the analysis section, we have theoretically shown by correctly choosing the system
design parameters, the single eavesdropper cannot perform decoding on the tag’s replies.
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Nevertheless, the single eavesdropper still tries to apply the two attacks discussed in Section
7.5.2.
The eavesdropper is assumed to know all system parameters and channel gains. In
the first attack, he subtracts the received signal by the varying amplitude level that is
immediate below. He repeats this procedure for all 40 tag’s symbol time to obtain the
waveform after removing the interference. In the second attack, the eavesdropper uses the
first point in the first symbol time as the reference, and subtract all subsequent received
signal points by the first point to remove the interference. Note that in the second attack,
the eavesdropper can use any points as a reference. In fact, we selected the first point from
each of 40 tag’s symbol time as the reference point, the resulting BERs are not affected.
Now the eavesdropper can perform the decoding. He computes the average for each
symbol time as well as the average for the entire waveform. If the magnitude of the signal
in each symbol time is less than or equal to one half of the average of the entire waveform,
then the eavesdropper decodes as bit 0. Otherwise, the eavesdropper decodes as bit 1.
The tag’s reply bit patterns are shown in the first plot of Figure 7.11. Second and third
plots in Figure 7.11 are the eavesdropper’s decoded bits after applying the two aforemen-
tioned attacks. The BER in both cases are close 0.5. Therefore, our experiment results
support our theoretical results in that by correctly choosing the system parameters, the
single eavesdropper cannot decode the tag’s replies with a higher successful rate than the
random guessing.
7.6.3 Performance Comparisons
In this section, we present the overall system performance in terms of decoding BER for
the different parties. The decoding BER is calculated from 104 decoded bits. The distance
is measured between the reader’s Tx to the tag. The results are shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: VRTA System Performances
Distance 25cm 10cm 5cm
BER at single adversary(10kHz) 0.50 0.50 0.48
BER at single adversary(20kHz) 0.51 0.49 0.50
BER at reader (10kHz) 0 0 0
BER at reader (20kHz) 0 0 0
Several conclusions are drawn from these results:
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Figure 7.11: Decoding Results of the Eavesdropper by Applying Two Attacks
• The varying rate does not affect the reader’s performance in terms of decoding tag’s
data.
• Single eavesdropper’s decoding BER is nearly 0.5, implying he can do no better than
random guessing.
These experimental results have confirmed with our theoretical analysis results.
7.7 Applications
The EPC Class1 Gen2 standard is the dominant standard for UHF tags which operates
in between 860MHz - 960MHz [28]. It is expected to be widely adopted to replace the
barcode for the inventory control among many other applications. However, security and
privacy has not taken importance in the current design of the standard. All tag’s replies
are vulnerable to eavesdroppers as they are sent in the plaintext through the unsecured
wireless channel.
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Our design can be slightly modified to incorporate into the standard for tag to reader
data confidentiality protection. The PN section as well as command section in our protocol
can be replaced by the EPC Class 1 Gen 2 command. After issuing the command, the read-
er immediately switches to transmitting time varying waveforms till tag stops responding.
This portion is identical to our original protocol. Once the reader receives the tag’s re-
sponse, it follows the decoding procedure shown in Section 7.4.2. In doing so, not only the
tag to reader confidentiality is ensured, but also the vulnerability with the authentication
protocol is alleviated.
7.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced VRTA, an novel approach to ensure tag to reader data
confidentiality. This scheme requires no modifications on the tag and the existing protocol-
s, only the amplitude of the reader supplied waveform is varied. Therefore, it has minimal
impact on the existing system. We have demonstrated the decoding procedure for the le-
gitimate reader. Moreover, we have considered two adversarial models. The single passive
eavesdropper and two colluding passive eavesdroppers. We have theoretically shown with
proper selections of the system parameters, our scheme can withstand the single eaves-
dropper’s attack. We have also shown using parameters selected for single eavesdropper
adversarial model, our VRTA scheme is secure against any arbitrary number of eavesdrop-
pers when the reader is placed close to the tag. In addition, we have implemented our
scheme using USRP and Intel WISP tag. Experimental results show the BER for the
legitimate reader and the single eavesdropper is 0 and very close to 0.5 respectively. This
confirms with our theoretical analysis. Finally, we propose to use VRTA in the current the
EPC Class1 Gen2 standard for tag to reader data confidentiality protection.
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Part IV
Active Eavesdropping Framework
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Chapter 8
Active Eavesdropping Attack in
FHSS RFID Systems
In this chapter, we present a general framework for active eavesdropping attack on FHSS
RFID systems utilizing backscattering modulation in the uplink direction. i.e., tag to
reader communication. The reason for considering FHSS RFID system is because many
RFID systems incorporate FHSS. FHSS has long known for its ability to improve system
performance in the presence of narrow band jamming, as well as to improve the security of
the system since the carrier frequency of the transmitted messages are constantly changing.
It is difficult for the adversary to capture the transmitted messages [94, 104].
Prior to the work presented by Qi et. al., all attacks in the literature have been mainly
focused on passive eavesdropping. These attacks include tag tracking [62], tag cloning
[34, 109], relay attacks [11, 36, 44] and side channel attacks [12, 67, 68, 41]. All these
attacks rely on the adversary being able to eavesdrop and obtain useful information from
the ongoing communications between the reader and the tag.
In [16], the authors first introduced the idea of an active eavesdropping attack for semi-
passive and passive RFID systems which use backscattering modulation in the uplink di-
rection. In the conventional passive eavesdropping attack, the adversary merely intercepts
the ongoing communication between the reader and the tag. In the active eavesdropping
attack, the malicious adversary exploits the property of backscatter modulation in that
the tag is not required to identify the frequency of the transmitted CW. As long as the
reader broadcasts the CW within the frequency response band of the tag’s antenna, the
tag responds to the reader’s query at the same carrier frequency. Therefore, in the active
eavesdropping attack, the adversary also broadcasts his own CW at a different frequency
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from the reader. Consequently, he observes signals from both his own broadcasted CW
and the reader’s CW. In doing so, the adversary can combine the two signals together to
achieve a better performance in terms of improved receiving SNR.
However, these authors have only laid out the general idea of the active eavesdropping
attack. Not much theoretical analysis was given. Motivated by this, we formalize the
general framework and model for the active eavesdropping attack in this work. We further
consider the active eavesdropping attack in a FHSS RFID system. We formulate an op-
timal strategy and derive theoretical limits for the adversary in the active eavesdropping
attack. We show with our active eavesdropping attack model, the adversary’s decoding
error probability can be greatly improved. Consequently, the tag-to-reader eavesdropping
range [62] is also increased.
The main focuses of this chapter are summarized below:
• We present a general active eavesdropping attack framework and model for FHSS
RFID systems.
• We provide theoretical error analysis for the active eavesdropping attack under slow
frequency hopping (SFH) and fast frequency hopping (FFH) scenarios.
• We conduct simulations and experiments to verify our theoretical results. We first
implement the active eavesdropper attack under SFH scenario using software defined
radios [103] and Intel WISP tag [111]. Then we conduct simulations for both SFH and
FFH scenarios. Finally, we present and compare these experimental and simulated
results in terms of decoding BER.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.1, we state the system
and adversarial models. In Section 8.2, we first present the mathematical formulation of
our problem. Then based on our problem formulation, we provide detailed analysis on the
decoding error probability of the active eavesdropper. In Section 8.3, we conduct experi-
ments and simulations to validate with our theoretical analysis. We also make comparisons
between the experimental and simulated data. Section 8.4 concludes our chapter.
8.1 System and Adversarial Models
In this section, we introduce the system and adversarial models this work is based on.
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Figure 8.1: RFID System Composed of Back-end database, Readers and Tags.
8.1.1 System Model
We consider the most common FHSS RFID system using backscatter modulation in the
uplink direction. The RFID system consists of three components: a back-end database,
one or multiple readers and one or multiple passive RFID tags as shown in Figure 8.1.
The connection from the reader to the database is assumed through a secure channel.
The communication between readers and tags are through insecure wireless channels. Since
one reader can only communicate with one tag at a time, the system model of our interest
can be reduced one reader and one passive tag.
In the uplink direction, the RFID tag communicates with the reader via backscattering
modulation. It switches its impedance either to low or high to denote a data bit of 1 or
0. We denote the gain coefficient when the tag sets its impedance to high (bit 0) and low
(bit 1) to be η0 and η1 respectively.
A FHSS RFID system can either be SFH or FFH system. It is dependent on the data
rate relative to the frequency hopping rate. If the frequency hopping rate is greater than
the tag’s data rate, then the employed system is a FFH system. Otherwise, it is a SFH
system.
8.1.2 Adversarial Model
In our adversarial model, the eavesdropper’s goal is to recover the messages transmitted
from the tag to the reader.
Unlike the conventional passive eavesdropper who merely “listens” to the channel, we
consider a stronger form of attack. Not only can the eavesdropper observe the communica-
tion between the reader and the tag, he can also transmit his own CW which is outside the
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range of all available frequency hopping channels. As discussed earlier, this exploits the
property of backscattering modulation in that the tag cannot differentiate the reader’s CW
from the adversary’s CW. All the tag does is switch its impedance to respond with one of
message bit 0 or 1. In this attack scenario, the eavesdropper is termed active eavesdropper
[16].
We further assume that while the adversary has knowledge on the FHSS nature of the
system, he does not have knowledge of the specific frequencies chosen at any given time.
However, the active eavesdropper knows the utilized frequency range, data rate and the
frequency hopping rate. In other words, the adversary has full knowledge of the FHSS
RFID system with the exception of the frequency hopping pattern itself. Furthermore, we
assume the eavesdropper employs N + 1 receiving antennas, and each of the N antennas is
tuned to one of the available hopping channels, except the last antenna which is tuned to
the frequency of the eavesdropper’s transmitted CW. The active eavesdropper can recover
the messages from the communications between the reader and the tag in two ways: 1)
Message replies from his own CW. 2) Message replies from the reader’s CW. From these
two sources, the eavesdropper then tries to optimally combine the recovered messages and
then performs decoding.
8.2 Analysis
In this section, we first mathematically formulate the problem. Then based on the formula-
tion, we perform a theoretical analysis of the active eavesdropper in terms of the decoding
error probability for both SFH and FFH cases under different scenarios.
8.2.1 Mathematical Formulation
From the system and adversarial model described previously, we form the following math-
ematical model for the active eavesdropper in this section.
We assume the legitimate reader transmits a CW at time instance t centered at k-th
channel modeled by
mk(t) =
√
2Etx
T
cos 2pifkt, 0 ≤ t < T, 1 ≤ k ≤ N,
where Etx is the energy of the transmitted signal, T is the bit duration and fk is the center
frequency of the k-th channel.
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At the receiver, since the adversary has no knowledge of channel hopping pattern, his
strategy is to capture the signals from all N channels. Let yk be the received signal on
the k-th channel and Ik ∈ {0, 1} where Ik = 1 represents the signal is being transmitted
on channel k and Ik = 0 represents the absence of the signal on channel k. At one time
instance, the signal can only occupy one of the N channels. Thus,
∑N
k=1 Ik = 1. Also, let
η ∈ {η0, η1} denote the reflection coefficient for the tag’s response of 0 and 1 respectively,
gk denote the channel gain on the k-th frequency and nk(t) denote the AWGN of k-th
frequency at time t. The resulting signals received by the eavesdropper in the passband
are:
y1(t) = I1ηg1
√
2Etx
T
cos 2pif1t+ n1(t),
y2(t) = I2ηg2
√
2Etx
T
cos 2pif2t+ n2(t),
...
yN(t) = INηgN
√
2Etx
T
cos 2pifN t+ nk(t).
Similarly, the adversary transmits and receives its own signals at a different frequency
outside the range of reader’s N hopping channels. We denote this frequency as fe, and
ye(t) = ηge
√
2Etx
T
cos 2pifet+ ne(t).
At the receiver, the active eavesdropper performs matched filtering for each carrier,
assuming each matched filter hk(t) has unit energy in the following form,
hk(t) =
√
2
T
cos 2pifkt, 0 ≤ t < T, 1 ≤ k ≤ N.
The resulting sampled baseband signals demodulated by the eavesdropper on all N
hopping channels with noise are then
r1 = I1ηg1
√
Etx + z1,
r2 = I2ηg2
√
Etx + z2,
...
rN = INηgN
√
Etx + zN
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Similarly, the eavesdropper obtain his own signal
re = ηge
√
Etx + ze.
Here, zk is the baseband noise on the k-th channel which is modeled by an independent
Gaussian random variables with a variance N0.
The active eavesdropper linearly combines the outputs of the matched filters,
se = re +
N∑
k=1
αkrk, (8.1)
where αk is the weight used for the k-th channel and without loss of generality, we take
the weight of eavesdropper’s channel to be 1.
8.2.2 Slow Frequency Hopping
Let
√
Eri denote the signal component of the eavesdropper’s received waveform, where
i = 0, 1, then from the mathematical formulation in (8.1), we obtain
√
Eri and the overall
noise variance σ2eff are respectively√
Eri = ηi(ge + αkgk)
√
Etx (8.2)
σ2eff = N0(1 +
N∑
m=1
α2m). (8.3)
We assume the probability of message 0 and 1 occurs equally likely, then the optimal
decoder uses threshold decoding rule and decodes the received signal into message de as
follows,
de =
{
0, se ≤
√
Er0+
√
Er1
2
,
1, otherwise.
(8.4)
Since the noise on each channel is independently Gaussian, then the linear combination
of these noises is still Gaussian with variance shown in (8.3). Following the standard proce-
dure for computing the error probability in channel corrupted by additive white Gaussian
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noise, one can readily derive the decoding error probability given the bit is being sent on
the k-th channel Pe|k as:
Pe|k = Q
(√
Er1 −
√
Er0
2σeff
)
. (8.5)
Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp(−
x2
2
) is the tail probability of the Gaussian distribution function.
Thus, the conditional error probability Pe|k and the average decoding probability Pe
are shown respectively by:
Pe|k = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(ge + αkgk)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
)
, (8.6)
Pe =
1
N
N∑
k=1
Q
(
(η1 − η0)(ge + αkgk)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
)
. (8.7)
In a SFH system, the reader’s CW remains in the same frequency channel considerably
longer than the tag’s symbol time. Let M be the number of hops the eavesdropper can
observe, then depending on the value of M relative to the number of hopping channels N ,
the eavesdropper adopts two different strategies. We discuss them separately.
Case 1: M ≤ N . In this case, the active eavesdropper only sees a few hops relative to
the number of available hopping channels. He is not able to observe messages sent on all
channels. Therefore, the adversary’s optimal strategy is to minimize the worst case Pe|k,
where
Pe|k = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(ge + αkgk)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
)
.
Since Q function is a decreasing function, minimizing Pe|k is equivalent to maximizing
the following expression:
max
αm
min
k
ge + gkαk√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
. (8.8)
To maximize (8.8), ge + αkgk = c,∀k, where c is a constant. The reason for this is
because suppose there exists one ge + αkgk < ge + αjgj = c
′, where j ∈ {1, · · · , N}/{k},
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then one can always increase the value of αk and decrease the rest of αjs accordingly such
that the denominator term
√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m remains the same, while ge +αkgk is increased
and other ge + αmgm terms are slightly decreased. Thus, (8.8) is not satisfied. Therefore,
the condition on ge + αkgk = c,∀k has to be met.
Consequently, we have αk =
c−ge
gk
, now (8.8) is reduced to
max
c
c√
1 +
∑N
m=1(
c−ge
gm
)2
.
The above problem is not simple to solve directly. However, for c ≥ 0, this problem is
equivalent to maximizing
max
c
c2
1 +
∑N
m=1(
c−ge
gm
)2
.
Following standard mathematical manipulations, we obtain
c =
1 +
∑N
m=1 g
2
e/g
2
m∑N
m=1 ge/g
2
m
, (8.9)
and
αk =
1
gegk
∑N
m=1
1
g2m
. (8.10)
Now define the constant β :=
∑
m ge/g
2
m. By substituting (8.9) and (8.10) into (8.7),
we obtain the theoretical optimal error probability given the message is sent on the k-th
channel Pe,opt|k as:
Pe,opt|k = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(1+geββ )
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑N
m=1(
1
gmβ
)2
)
. (8.11)
The solution in this case is a closed form solution. (8.10) shows how to compute the optimal
linear combining coefficients provided the eavesdropper is able to obtain all N + 1 channel
gains. The corresponding theoretical optimal decoding error probability is provided in
(8.11).
Case 2: M  N . In this case, the number of hops are much greater than the number
of available channels. This implies the eavesdropper is able to observe message bits from
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all N hopping channels with approximately equal likelihood. Therefore, the eavesdropper’s
performance is determined by the average decoding error probability shown in (8.7). Here,
the eavesdropper must try to minimize the average error probability as follows:
min
αm
Pe =
1
N
N∑
k=1
Q
(
(η1 − η0)(ge + αkgk)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
)
. (8.12)
In general, this error probability expression is non-linear and the optimal value for all αks
cannot be easily determined. An upper and lower bound on this expression can be obtained
as follows:
1
N
max
αm
Pe|k ≤ Pe = 1
N
N∑
k=1
Pe|k ≤ max
αm
Pe|k.
Thus, minimizing the worst Pe|k provides practical bounds on the error performance. In
doing so, the adversary would minimize the channel with the worst decoding error proba-
bility, making the decoding error probability across all channels identical. Moreover, even
though an approximation has been used in evaluating the solution, under moderate to high
SNR values, Pe obtained using this approximation is very close to the minimum value of
Pe. In this case, the following expression is evaluated:
max
αm
min
k
ge + gkαk√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
.
This condition is identical to the previous case. The solution thus is also identical,
namely
Pe,opt = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(1+geββ )
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑
m(
1
gmβ
)2
)
.
8.2.3 Fast Frequency Hopping
In the FFH scenario, the carrier frequency changes multiple times in one bit duration. Let
L represent the number of hops per bit, similar to the SFH scenario, the signal component
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of the received waveform
√
Eri, where i = 0, 1 and the variance of the overall received noise
σ2eff are respectively
√
Eri = ηi
1
L
L∑
l=1
(ge + αs(l)gs(l))
√
Etx, (8.13)
σ2eff = N0(1 +
N∑
m=1
α2m). (8.14)
Here, s(l) maps l-th time slot to one of N available hopping channels.
Identical to the SFH case, the decoding error probability for the eavesdropper is
Pe = Q
(√
Er1 −
√
Er0
2σeff
)
. (8.15)
Given the channel hopping pattern is (s(1), · · · s(L)), by substituting (8.13) and (8.14)
into (8.15), we obtain the decoding error probabilityPe|s(1),···s(L) as :
Pe|s(1),··· ,s(L) = Q
(
(η1 − η0) 1L
∑L
l=1(ge + αs(l)gs(l))
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
)
, (8.16)
Computing the average bit error probability requires considering all possible combina-
tions of hopping patterns, this is expressed as follows:
Pe =
1
NL
∑
i1,··· ,iN
(
L
i1, · · · , iN
)
Q
(
(η1 − η0) 1L
∑N
k=1 ik(ge + αkgk)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑
m α
2
m
)
. (8.17)
Here ik is an integer which indicates the number of times the message has hopped to the
k-th channel.
Depending on the values of L and N , we also divide the FFH scenario into 2 cases.
Case 1: L ≤ N . Similar to case 1 of SFH scenario, we are also interested in minimize the
decoding error probability for the worst combination of the hopped channels Pe|s(1),··· ,s(L).
This is equivalent to evaluating the following expression:
max
αm
min
s(l)
1
L
∑L
l=1(ge + αs(l)gs(l))√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
. (8.18)
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The inner condition in (8.18) implies all s(l)s are identical, and this channel is the worst
channel. We denote this channel as s, where s = 1, 2, · · · , N . Note that if there exist
multiple worst channels, we can pick any one of these channels as the worst channel and
the outcome of this analysis will not be affected. In dosing so, (8.18) reduce to
max
αm
(ge + αsgs)√
1 +
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
. (8.19)
Since s is already the worst channel, (8.19) has the identical form as (8.8). The closed form
solution for minimizing the worst decoding error probability is also identical, namely:
Pe,opt|s(1),··· ,s(L) = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(1+geββ )
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑N
m=1(
1
gmβ
)2
)
.
Case 2: L  N . In this case, the number of hops per bit is much greater than the
number of channels. Therefore, we can make the approximation that each channel gets
equal amount of hops. Then the average error probability in (8.17) becomes
Pe = Q
(
(η1 − η0) 1N
∑N
k=1(ge + αkgk)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑
m α
2
m
)
.
Similarly to case 2 of the SFH scenario, the closed form solution for minimizing Pe
is difficult to evaluate in practise. We also approximate the solution by minimizing the
error probability of the worst channel Pe|k = Q
(
(η1−η0)(ge+αkgk)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1+
∑N
m=1 α
2
m
)
. This reduces to the
identical problem as scenario 1 of case 1. In doing so, ge + αkgk = c are identical for all k.
The optimal error probability Pe,opt has the same form as case 2 of slow hopping, namely:
Pe,opt = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(1+geββ )
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
1 +
∑
m(
1
gmβ
)2
)
.
8.2.4 Summary
In this section, we have considered the active eavesdropper’s error performance under both
SFH and FFH settings. We have provided the closed form solution on the decoding error
probability for two cases of SFH and FFH scenarios. Then by assuming the adversary’s
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goal is to minimize the decoding error probability of the worst channel, we have found a
practical bound on the eavesdropper’s error performance for the other two cases of SFH
and FFH scenarios. Moreover, the error probability expression for all four cases has the
identical solution. Finally, under moderate to high SNR values, the solution obtained using
the approximation is very close to the minimum value of the error probability.
8.3 Experimental and Simulated Results
In this section, we verify the active eavesdropping attack analysis via experimental and
simulated results. We conduct experiments by implementing our own FHSS RFID system
and we perform simulations using MatLab.
8.3.1 Experimental Setup
In the experiments, the Intel WISP tag is used as the passive RFID tag [111]. The USPRs,
namely one USRP1 and two USRP-N210s are configured as readers. They are equipped
with the RFX900 daughter board. The daughter board’s operating frequency is 750-
1050MHz. We have used one of USRP-N210 to be the legitimate reader, while others
act as the adversary. Throughout all experiments, we have fixed the channel bandwidth
at 256kHz. Finally, the overall sampling rate for both the reader and the eavesdropper is
set at 1MHz.
8.3.2 Channel Gain
When launching the active eavesdropping attack, we have shown earlier that the eaves-
dropper should have a good estimation of all channel gains in order to compute the optimal
αks and to minimize his decoding error probability. In this experiment, we first find the
channel gains for each frequency.
The tag’s response within the frequency spectrum 860MHz - 960MHz is examined. This
is the frequency used for ultra high frequency (UHF) RFID communication specified in
the EPC Class1 Gen2 standard [28]. We start at 860MHz, and each time the frequency
is incremented by 1MHz. We conduct three separate experiments to gather responses for
noise, bit 0 and bit 1. First, we simply tune the receiver to the desired frequency to
record the noise measurements. Second, we program the tag to return a constant bit 0 and
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Figure 8.2: Channel Gain between 860MHz - 960MHz
transmit a constant amplitude CW to obtain the response for a 0 bit at the receiving end.
Finally, we program the tag to return a constant bit 1, and again transmit the same CW
to obtain the response of a 1 bit at the receiving end.
A total of 10 seconds worth of measurements or approximately 10 million samples are
collected at each frequency for each experiment. The mean of these samples is taken as
the amplitude for bit 0 and 1. The standard deviation of the noise is also computed.
The relative eavesdropper’s received signal power to the reader’s transmitted CW power
is computed and shown in Figure 8.2.
In Figure 8.2, we show the ratio of the eavesdropper’s received power of noise, bit 0 and
bit 1 relative to the reader’s transmitted CW power measured in dB. i.e., 20 log10(s/c),
where s is one of the standard deviation of the noise, the amplitude of the received bit 0
or bit 1, and c is the amplitude of the transmitted CW. The gain for message bit 0, bit
1 and noise are all nearly constant throughout the entire frequency spectrum. From this
experiment, we thus conclude entire frequency bands experience flat gains.
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8.3.3 Error Analysis Revisited
In this section, we first compare active eavesdropping and conventional passive eavesdrop-
ping attacks. From the channel gain measurement results in the previous section, we have
concluded the entire RFID frequency spectrum experience flat gains. Consequently, we
replace the reader’s channel gain gk,∀k with gr. Then we further reduce parameters c, αks
and the minimum error probability Pe,opt to:
c =
g2r +Ng
2
e
Nge
, (8.20)
αopt =
gr
Nge
, (8.21)
Pe,opt = Q
(
(η1 − η0)
√
g2r + g
2
eN
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
N
)
. (8.22)
Note that αk is no longer a function of the channel so we simply write as as αopt.
Remark: If all channels experience flat gains, then the error probability expression
reduces to (8.22) and is no longer an approximation, as it is the exact solution to minimizing
the decoding error probability in case 2 for SFH and FFH scenarios. Equation (8.21)
provides the corresponding expression for αopt.
In the case of a passive eavesdropping attack, the adversary’s own CW is absent. We
simply remove the ge term, hence his decoding error probability becomes:
Pe,opt = Q
(
(η1 − η0)gr
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
N
)
. (8.23)
Based on the ratio of ge and gr, we divide the discussion into 4 cases.
Case 1: gr  ge. In this scenario, the signal received by the active eavesdropper from
his own transmitted CW is much stronger than the reader’s signal. This can result from
the active eavesdropper being closer to the tag than the reader and/or transmitting at a
higher power. Consequently, αopt ≈ 0 and
Pe,opt = Q
(
(η1 − η0)ge
√
Etx
2
√
N0
)
. (8.24)
If the channel gain of the active eavesdropper is greater than that of the reader, then the
SNR of the active eavesdropper’s own CW signal is much stronger than the SNR of the
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other N hopping channels. In this case, there will be almost no contribution from the read-
er’s CW signal. The best strategy for the active eavesdropper is to just decode based on
his own transmitted CW without taking into account of the other channels. Consequently,
the SNR improvement due to reader’s CW becomes negligible.
Case 2: gr ≈ ge. This can result from one of the following scenarios. 1) The active
eavesdropper is approximately the same distance away from the tag as the reader and the
power of both of their CW is also approximately the same. 2) The active eavesdropper
is further away than the reader but it is transmitting at a higher power. 3) The active
eavesdropper is closer to the tag than the reader but it is transmitting at a lower power. In
this case, the optimal αopt =
1
N
and the corresponding decoding error probability becomes:
Pe,opt = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(gr
√
N + 1)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
N
)
. (8.25)
Comparing with (8.23), we see that if the strength of the eavesdropper’s received signal
from his own CW and reader’s CW is comparable, then there is a gain of
√
N + 1 compared
to the case that he can only observe from the reader’s CW. By gain we mean the improve-
ment in the received signal strength due to the active eavesdropper’s own broadcasted CW.
This gain is very significant, especially when the value of N is large.
Case 3: gr ≈ ge
√
N In this case, active eavesdropper’s received power from his own
CW is N times higher than the reader’s. Then we have αopt =
1√
N
and
Pe,opt = Q
(
(η1 − η0)gr
√
2
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
N
)
. (8.26)
In this case, the contribution of signal power from the active eavesdropper’s CW is identical
to the reader’s.
Case 4: gr  ge. The signal received by the active eavesdropper from his own trans-
mitted CW is considerably weaker than the reader’s signal. For example, if gr ≈ Nge, then
we have αopt ≈ 1 and
Pe,optimal = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(gr
√
N + 1)
√
Etx
2
√
N0N
)
. (8.27)
In this case, the ratio of active eavesdropping to passive eavesdropping is
√
N+1√
N
. When the
number of available hopping frequency N is large, this gain can be neglected.
106
We take case 2 as an example to show the gain behaviour. First, we define γ := 1
α
and
rewrite the error probability Pe as:
Pe = Q
(
(η1 − η0)(γge + gr)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
γ2 +N
)
As discussed earlier, because gr is identical across all channels, then αopt is no longer a
function of the channel, it is identical for all channels. Then there also exists one γopt which
minimizes Pe and this γopt =
1
αopt
. The reason for writing the error probability expression
in this way is because we can readily observe the gain due to the active eavesdropper’s CW
signal.
Since η0, η1 N0 and Etx are all constants, we have omitted these terms and only plotted
γge+gr√
γ2+N
vs γ. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we set gr = ge = 1 and vary the
value of γ from 0 to 20. Note again that a higher value of γ indicates a higher ratio of
signal strength between the eavesdropper’s CW and the readers’s CW, while γ = 0 implies
the absence of the eavesdropper’s CW. Finally, we have chosen 3 values of N , namely 5,
10 and 50 to represent different numbers of hopping channels. The power gain measured
in dB (i.e., 20 log10
γge+gr√
γ2+N
) as a function of γ is shown in Figure 8.3.
From this figure, we observe a significant improvement in the received signal strength if
the eavesdropper can broadcast and receive from his own CW. Theoretically, the maximum
power gain is bounded by
√
N + 1 or 20 log10
√
N + 1dB. This occurs at γopt = N , corre-
sponding to αopt =
1
N
. This is exactly what we observe from the figure. This implies the
greater the number of hopping channels N , the greater the gain of the active eavesdrop-
per’s signal is. This matches our intuition because since without knowing which channel
the message is sent on, the eavesdropper must combine the received signals from all chan-
nels. As a result, the received SNR of the eavesdropper decreases proportionally with N .
Meanwhile, the SNR of eavesdropper’s own obtained message remains constant. Therefore,
the improvement in SNR would be higher with higher values of hopping channels N .
8.3.4 Active Eavesdropping Experimental Results
In this section, we conduct experiments to illustrate the active eavesdropping attack. We
try to comply with the EPC Class1 Gen2 standard [28]. The frequency hopping range is
between 902 - 928MHz to comply with the FCC frequency hopping requirement in North
America as specified in the EPC Class1 Gen2 standard. Consequently, we have selected the
adversary’s carrier frequency to be centered at 905MHz to broadcast his own CW, while
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Figure 8.3: Power Gain vs γ
the reader hops between 910 - 914MHz, i.e., 5 carrier frequencies with a channel frequency
increment of 1MHz.
Moreover, the transmitting antennas for both the reader and the adversary are broad-
casting a CW of the same amplitude. All transmitting and receiving antennas are set to
have a gain of 5dB. We further set the tag’s data rate to 100kbps and the channel hopping
time to 1s. This implies each channel hopping duration should approximately contains
100,000 coded bits.
Finally, the passive RFID tag is programmed to return a 64-bit Miller modulated
subcarrier code from 8-bit message bits using the Miller modulated subcarrier encoding
with M = 4. The 8-bit message is 10101100. This is because Miller modulated subcarrier
coding is used in EPC Class1 Gen2 for uplink transmission. Consequently, the encoding
rate is 1
8
and the actual data rate is 12.5kbps.
The transmitting and receiving antennas of the reader is placed at 10cm away from
the tag. We first conduct the experiment and measure the responses of the tag due to
the reader’s CW. In this experiment, the frequency is hopped randomly amongst those 5
frequencies. Each channel hopping duration is 1s. Then we conduct three more experi-
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Figure 8.4: Active Eavesdropper Equidistant from the Reader
ments by varying the location of the eavesdropper’s transmitting and receiving antennas
to measure the responses of the tag due to the eavesdropper’s CW.
In the first experiment, the tag is also placed at 10 cm away from both the eavesdrop-
per’s transmitting and receiving antennas. The tag’s response observed by the eavesdropper
is shown in Figures 8.4 and 8.5. In Figure 8.4, the eavesdropper’s carrier frequency is cen-
tered at 905MHz, his received signal on this frequency is continuous and always contains
the tag’s replied messages. On the other 5 frequencies, we observe that each frequency
obtain replies for approximately 1s. Figure 8.5 shows the details of the tag’s response on
each frequency. Note that in this figure, we have removed the DC component of the signal
to allow for better comparisons between all 6 figures. We notice in this experiment, the
received signal strength due to reader’s CW is comparable to the eavesdropper’s. This is
expected as all transmitters and receivers are equidistant from the tag.
In the second experiment, the transmitting and receiving antennas of the eavesdropper
are moved closer to 5cm away from the tag. The tag’s response observed by the eaves-
dropper is shown in Figures 8.6 and 8.7. In this case, the eavesdropper clearly observes a
stronger signal from his own CW than the reader’s CW. Meanwhile, the signal strength
among all 5 hopping frequencies remains approximately the same.
In the last experiment, the transmitting and receiving antennas of the eavesdropper are
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Figure 8.5: Close-up View of Active Eavesdropper Equidistant from the Reader
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Figure 8.6: Active Eavesdropper Closer to the Tag than the Reader
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Figure 8.7: Close-up View of Active Eavesdropper Closer to the Tag than the Reader
Table 8.1: Experimental Data
20 log10
(η1−η0)gk
σk
905 MHz 910 MHz 911 MHz 912 MHz 913 MHz 914 MHz
Attacker Stronger 15.58 10.04 8.34 8.16 8.50 8.82
Equal Strength 8.33 10.04 8.34 8.16 8.50 8.82
Attacker Weaker 3.72 10.04 8.34 8.16 8.50 8.82
moved further to 15cm away from the tag. The tag’s response observed by the eavesdropper
is shown in Figures 8.8 and 8.9. In this case, the eavesdropper clearly observes a weaker
signal from his own CW than the reader’s CW.
We have processed the experimental data in MatLab on the received signals from each
frequency for all 3 experiments. This is summarized in Table 8.1. In the table, we show
the ratio of the difference in the amplitude of the received bits 0 and 1 to the standard
deviation of the noise for each hopping channel. These values are measured in dB. i.e.,
20 log10
(η1−η0)gk
σk
. gk and σk are the channel gain and the noise standard deviation on the
k-th hopping channel.
Now we define
√
∆E
2σeff
:= (η1−η0)(γge+gr)
√
Etx
2
√
N0
√
γ2+N
for simplification. This is the parameter inside
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Figure 8.8: Active Eavesdropper Further Away from the Tag than the Reader
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Figure 8.9: Close-up View of Active Eavesdropper Further Away from the Tag than the
Reader
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Figure 8.10: Power Gain vs γ for All Three Experiments
the error probability Q function. We plot the value of 20 log10
√
∆E
2σeff
as a function of γ for
all three experimental results. This is shown in Figure 8.10. The adversary is interested
in finding the greatest value of
√
∆E
σeff
, which would result in the lowest theoretical decoding
BER.
The curve labeled in ‘o’ resembles case 1 from our discussion, where the signal strength
of the eavesdropper is stronger than the reader. From the theoretical result derived in
(8.24), the optimal value of
√
∆E
2σeff
occurs when αopt ≈ 0. This implies there is almost no
benefit to the eavesdropper to combine his signal with the reader’s signal. From the figure,
we see the curve is non-decreasing, the greater the value of γ, the greater the
√
∆E
2σeff
. Note
that γopt =
1
αopt
. Therefore, the contribution of the reader’s signal becomes negligible.
Moreover, the gain is also the greatest in this case. In this particular example, we see a
gain of of approximately 15dB.
The curve labeled in ‘x’ resembles case 2 from our analysis. In this case, the signal
strength of the eavesdropper’s own signal and the reader’s signal are comparable. From
(8.25), we expect a gain of
√
N + 1 or 7.78dB between the value of γ = 0 and the maximum
value. Moreover, we expect this maximum value to occur when γopt = 5. From the figure,
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we observe this is exactly the case. The maximum gain is approximately 7.70dB, with
γopt = 5.01.
The curve labeled in ‘’ resembles case 3 from our discussion, where the attacker’s
received signal strength from his own CW is weaker than the reader’s. In this case, we
expect a gain of
√
2 or 3dB. This maximum should occur at γopt =
√
5. By observing
from the figure, we see the gain is a little more than 3.4dB, and this occurs at γopt = 2.7,
which is very close to our theoretical result. The discrepancy between the experimental
and theoretical results is due to the experiential data do not match precisely with the
theoretical conditions.
In conclusion, we see all 3 experiments have confirmed with our theoretical findings.
Compared with the conventional passive eavesdropping attack, the active eavesdropper can
potentially have a huge gain in terms of improving his decoding error probability if he is
able to actively broadcast a CW and obtain his own response from the tag.
8.3.5 Simulated and Experimental Decoding BER in a SFH Sys-
tem
In this section, we conduct simulations for both SFH and FFH scenarios. From our exper-
imental data gathered in the previous section and simulation data obtained in this section,
we compute the decoding BER as a function of γ. We vary the value of γ from 0 to
10 to observe the corresponding decoding BER for the adversary. Then we compare the
simulated and experimental results.
Simulated Decoding BER
The simulation follows the identical setup as the experiment. We use 905MHz as the
carrier frequency for the active eavesdropper to broadcast his CW. We allocate 910MHz
- 922.5MHz for a total of 50 available hopping channels. Each channel is separated by
250kHz from the two adjacent channels. We have simulated with 3 different hopping
channels. They are N = 5, 10 and 50. The tag replies with the same 64-bit Miller
modulated subcarrier code from the 8-bit message. Moreover, from the experiment, we have
identified that all channels have equal gains and observed that the value of 20 log10
(η1−η0)gk
σk
is approximately 8.5dB on each channel. Therefore, we set this value also to 8.5dB across
all hopping channels including the eavesdropper’s channel in the simulation. Furthermore,
we have mentioned earlier that in the experiment, the sampling rate is set at 1MHz, the
tag’s data rate is 100kbps. This implies theoretically, each Miller coded bit contains 10
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samples. Therefore, in the simulation section, we also set each bit to contain 10 samples.
Each bit is decoded by taking the average of 10 consecutive samples and using the threshold
decision rule as shown in (8.4). Finally, the BER is calculated over 105 with Miller coded
bits and 10
5
8
with message bits.
We plot BER vs γ in Figure 8.11. We observe initially BER decreases as γ increases
for all cases. This is expected because according to our analysis,
√
∆E
2σeff
always increases for
γ < N .
Moreover, from this figure, we have observed that the smaller the number of available
hopping channels N , the lower the decoding error probability. This is also expected because
at one time instance, only one hopping channel contains the signal, all other channels
contain only noise. Therefore, the greater the amount of hopping channels, the lower the
combined SNR will be. This in turn would result in a higher decoding BER.
Finally, we see in general, BER of decoded message bits is lower than the Miller coded
bits. This is expected because the purpose of coding at the expense of reducing the rate
is to improve the decoding BER. The only exception is at the lower γ with 50 hopping
channels. In this case, BER of decoded message bits is slightly higher than the Miller
coded bits. The reason for this is because the hamming distance between codewords 0
and 1 is 4 for our Miller modulated subcarrier codes. This implies only one error can be
corrected according to the classic coding theory [47]. Since the received coded bits have
exceeded the error correction capability, we can expect the decoded message bits to have
a higher BER.
Experimental Decoding BER
In this section, we compare the simulated and experimental results. We take the experi-
mental data where the active eavesdropper’s received signal strength from his own CW is
comparable to the reader’s CW. The BER is calculated from 105 Miller coded message bits.
The corresponding number of decoded message bits are 10
5
8
. Moreover, we have taken the
simulation results for N = 5 from the previous section. The comparison on the decoding
BER as a function of γ for both the simulated and experimental results is shown in Figure
8.12.
In general, the simulated results agree with the experimental results. By comparing
both the Miller coded bits and the decoded message bits between the experimental and
simulated results, we can observe they almost overlap with each other at lower value of γ.
However, there exist some discrepancies as γ increases. The BER for the experimental
result decreases slower than the simulated results. The reason is that from the experimen-
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Figure 8.11: Simulation Results for Decoding BER in a SFH System with Three Different
Hopping Channels
tal observations, we have discovered not all Miller coded bits contain exactly 10 samples.
In some cases one coded bit contains 9 samples. In other cases, it contains 11 samples.
However, in our decoder, we did not make this adjustment. Each bit is decoded by averag-
ing and using threshold decision rule over exactly 10 consecutive samples. The imperfect
sampling interval induced BER is a constant and it dominate at higher values of γ. This
imperfect sampling intervals can lead to additional decoding errors, which are unaccounted
for in the simulated result. Thus, this additional source of errors causes the discrepancy
between the simulated and experimental results. This is especially noticeable at higher
value of γ.
8.3.6 Simulated Decoding BER in a FFH System
When we were conducting the experiments, we have observed 10ms is the fastest time the
USRP can hop between frequencies. When we try to program it at a faster hopping rate,
the resulting signal are highly corrupted by noises, making the decoding very difficult. Due
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Figure 8.12: Experimental Results for Decoding BER in a SFH System with N = 5
to this limitation, we are unable implement a FFH RFID system and gather meaningful
results. Therefore, we decide to use simulation to validate our theoretical results.
In the simulation, we set the hopping time to 1µs. Equivalently, the hopping rate is
1MHz. The tag’s data rate is fixed at 100kbps. Since the sampling rate is also 1MHz, this
implies each hopping frequency contains exactly one sample and each bit is composed of
samples from 10 consecutive hopping frequencies. Again, we have plotted BER vs γ. The
resulting BER is shown in Figure 8.13. By comparing Figures 8.11 and 8.13, we observe
there is virtually no difference in the BER behaviour between the SFH and FFH cases.
This is expected because as mentioned earlier, under the assumption that all channel gains
are equal, the theoretical analysis we derived earlier for computing the error probability
for both the SFH and FFH cases reduce to the same expression.
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Figure 8.13: Simulation Results for Decoding BER in a FFH System with Three Different
Hopping Channels
8.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have first presented the framework of active eavesdropping attack for
FHSS RFID systems. Then we have provided the theoretical analysis in terms of decoding
error probability under SFH and FFH scenarios. We have found a closed form solution
for two cases of SFH and FFH scenarios and came up with a bound for the other two
scenarios. However, when all channels experience flat gains, the bound also becomes the
closed form solution. Furthermore, we have implemented the active eavesdropper attack
under SFH using software defined radios and Intel WISP tags. In Addition, using the
identical parameters from the experiment, we have conducted simulations for both SFH
and FFH cases. Finally, we have compared the simulated and experimental results. From
these two results, we have concluded that the improvement in the decoding BER can
be very significant. The active eavesdropper can obtain a much better result than the
conventional passive eavesdropper.
Consequently, active eavesdropping attack can result in a great improvement int the
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malicious adversary’s decoding capability. This gives the adversary an advantage over the
reader in that the adversary can just broadcast his own CW if he needs a stronger signal in
order to break the underlying RFID system. Thus, this attack should be considered when
securing RFID systems in the future.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize the main contributions presented in this thesis. In addition,
we provide some potential future work directions.
9.1 Conclusions and Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, our main contributions are divided into four chapters, Chapters 5-8. These
are summarized below:
• New Efficient PHY Layer OFDM Encryption Schemes: In Chapter 5, we
have proposed a new encryption scheme called OFDM-Enc. We show this scheme
is computationally secure against the adversary. This scheme encrypts the message
by term-wise multiplication of each of the in-phase and quadrature components of
time domain OFDM symbols with keystreams a and b, where a and b are {-1, 1}
valued binary sequences. Due to the non-linear transformation of IDFT, the malicious
adversary observes a higher decoding error probability than conventional XOR-Enc
when he performs direct decoding on the modulated ciphertext symbols. In addition,
we have performed an initial security analysis on the newly proposed scheme. We have
shown it can withstand all attacks considered. Finally, we have performed simulations
to further validate our scheme. Simulation results have confirmed with our theoretical
findings. Simulations have shown that the malicious adversary without the knowledge
of the key, cannot obtain a higher decoding successful rate than random guessing.
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• Extension of OFDM-Enc to General Communication System: In Chapter
6, we have extended OFDM-Enc to general communication systems. Since the en-
cryption is essentially performed by varying the phase of the modulated symbols,
we just adopt a more general term P-Enc. We formulate mathematical models for
P-Enc and XOR-Enc for different modulation schemes. These include ASK, PSK
and QAM modulations. Using these mathematical formulations, we compare the
security, encryption efficiency and hardware complexity between these two encryp-
tion methods. In addition, we have shown P-Enc at the PHY layer can resist traffic
analysis attack. Furthermore, at the system level by taking into considerations of
channel coding, we have once again compared XOR-Enc and P-Enc. Finally, we have
conducted two simulations to compare the performance of XOR-Enc and P-Enc in
terms of the decoding SER. From both simulations, we have observed P-Enc has a
slightly lower SER than XOR-Enc. .
• PHY layer RFID Confidentiality Protection Scheme: In Chapter 7, we have
introduced VRTA, an novel approach to ensure tag to reader data confidentiality.
This scheme requires no modifications on the tag and the existing protocols, only
the amplitude of the reader supplied CW is varied. Consequently, it has minimal
impact on the existing system. We have shown both the encoding and decoding
procedures for the legitimate reader. Moreover, we consider two adversarial models.
The single passive eavesdropper and multiple colluding passive eavesdroppers. We
have theoretically demonstrated that with proper selections of the system parameters,
our scheme can withstand both attacking models. In addition, we have implemented
our scheme as well as the single eavesdropping attacking model using USRP and Intel
WISP tag. Experimental results show the decoding BER of the legitimate reader is
close to 0, while the decoding BER of the eavesdropper is close to 0.5. Finally, we
have proposed the use of VRTA in the current the EPC Class 1 Gen 2 standard for
data confidentiality protection.
• Active Eavesdropping Framework: In Chapter 8, we have presented the frame-
work of active eavesdropping attack under FHSS RFID systems. In this framework,
we have provided the theoretical analysis in terms of decoding error probability for
both SFH and FFH scenarios. Specifically, we have found a closed form solution for
two cases of SFH and FFH scenarios and came up with a bound for the other two
cases. Moreover, when all channels experience flat gains, the bound also becomes
the closed form solution. In addition, we have implemented the active eavesdropper
attack for SFH scenario using USRP and Intel WISP tags. We have also conducted
simulations for both SFH and FFH scenarios. Finally, we compare the simulated and
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experimental results in terms of decoding BER. We have shown the improvement in
the decoding BER can be very significant. The active eavesdropper can obtain a
much better successful decoding rate than the conventional passive eavesdropper.
9.2 Future Work
Security and privacy have received a lot of attentions in both the industry and academia.
As technologies evolve and time elapses, people are becoming more and more aware the
importance of security and privacy of the underlying wireless communication system. In
this thesis, we have focused on using PHY layer approaches to secure the underlying
communication system. We have provided some solutions to our problems. We have also
presented the active eavesdropping attack framework for FHSS RFID systems. However,
there are much more that can be done and deserve further attentions following our studies.
• New Efficient PHY Layer OFDM Encryption Scheme: In Chapter 5, we have
only provided an initial investigation on our proposed OFDM-Enc. In the future
work, we would like to consider the following questions.
– We have reasoned due to the non-linear transformation of IDFT, the adversary
observes a higher decoding error probability when he performs demodulation
and decoding without the keystreams. However, it is unclear theoretically, what
is the impact of this non-linear masking? Or equivalently, how do X′ and Y′ in
(5.16) and (5.17) behave in the presence of keystreams a and b.
– Due to the non-linear transformation of IDFT, when data are encrypted using
OFDM-Enc, the encrypted ciphertext symbols are sometimes no longer valid
OFDM symbols, it is worthwhile to investigate and classify the condition in
which the encrypted ciphertext symbols fall under valid OFDM symbols. If
this can be done, then we can use informational theoretical argument to further
validate our proposed encryption method.
• Extension of OFDM-Enc to General Communication System: In Chapter 6,
from our simulations, we have discovered that P-Enc has a lower SER than XOR-Enc.
If this can be proven theoretically, then this provides P-Enc with another advantage
over XOR-Enc other than the potentially reduced keystream size.
• PHY layer RFID Confidentiality Protection Scheme: In Chapter 7, we have
only provided a framework and some initial security analysis. For future works, we
would like to consider the following problems:
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– Implement VRTA within the EPC Class1 Gen2 framework to further evaluate
the performance of our proposed system. EPC Class1 Gen2 standard is proposed
to replace barcode for inventory and product tracking. Thus, it has a wide range
of applications across different industries. By verifying the VRTA performance
under the EPC Class1 Gen2 framework, we then can be aware whether our
approach can have practical implications in real world applications.
– Backscattering modulation is widely used in battery-less wireless sensors. We
can extend our system to other backscattering modulation systems for security
enhancement.
– Consider other adversarial models and known attacks. This include active ad-
versarial models where the attacker can send his own signals, whether they are
just noises aimed at jamming the channel or commands aimed at obtain useful
information from the tag. Some potential prevention methods that can be in-
vestigated including possible detection mechanisms in the reader as well as tag
side protections.
• Active Eavesdropping Framework :In Chapter 8, we have only considered lin-
ear combining of the received signals. For future work, we would like to consider
non-linear combining methods to see if the eavesdropper can yield a better result.
Moreover, we would like to consider the impact of this attack on the security model
of RFID systems. Finally, we would like to explore how this attack would assist the
adversary in carrying out other attacks existed in the literature.
• Extending Golay’s Large Zero Autocorrelation Zone Work: As a continua-
tion of my master study, we have found three constructions of Golay sequences [38]
constructed using the method in [24, 82] over ZH which contain a large zero auto-
correlation zone, where H ≥ 2 is an arbitrary even integer. Let Rτ be the periodic
autocorrelation function of a sequence with shifts τ , with selected permutations pi
and affine transformations, these sequences have a large ZACZ. They are summarized
below.
(i) Ra(τ) = 0 for τ ∈ (0, 2m−2] ∪ [3 · 2m−2, 2m).
(ii) Ra(τ) = 0 for τ ∈ [2m−2, 3 · 2m−2].
(iii) Ra(τ) = 0 for τ ∈ (0, 2m−3] ∪ [3 · 2m−3, 5 · 3m−3] ∪ [7 · 2m−3, 2m).
We have omitted this work as this topic not related to my thesis. Nevertheless,
this work definitely also deserves some attentions. Recently, Golay complementary
sequences have been proposed to perform ISI channel estimation [39], MIMO-OFDM
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channel estimation [85] and MIMO transmit beamforming [65]. In addition, they
have long known to have good PMEPR property (maximum 2 or 3dB) [71, 106],
which is highly desired in a multi-carrier communication system setting. Therefore,
we can further investigate how to best combine and use different properties of Golay
sequences to achieve a better performance in a wireless communication system.
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Appendix A
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
3GPP 3rd generation partnership project
ASK mplitude shift keying
AWGN additive white Gaussian noise
BER bit error rate
BPSK binary phase shift keying
CAVE cellular authentication and voice encryption
CDMA code division multiple access
CP cyclic prefix
CW continuous wave
DAB digital audio broadcasting
DL downlink
DVB digital video broadcasting
DoS denial of service
DPA differential power analysis
EM eletromagnetic
EPC evolved packet core
E-UTRAN evolved UMTS terrestrial radio access
FCC federal communications commission
FFH fast frequency hopping
FFT fast fourier transform
FHSS frequency hopping spread spectrum
FSK frequency shift keying
GE gate equivalent
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HF high frequency
IDFT inverse discrete fourier transform
ISI intersymbol interference
LF low frequency
LOS line of sight
LTE long term evolution
MAC media access control
MAP maximum aposterior probability
ML maximum likelyhood
NFC near field communication
OFDM orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
OFDMA orthogonal frequency division multiple access
OFDM-Enc OFDM encryption
OTP one time pad
PDCP packet data convergence protocol
PDU packet data unit
P-Enc phase encryption
PHY physical
PIE pulse-interval encoding
PMEPR peak-to-mean average power ratio
PN pseudo-noise
PRSG pseudo-random sequence generator
PSK phase shift keying
QAM quadrature amplitude modulation
QPSK quadrature phase shift keying
RFID radio frequency identification
RLC radio link control
SDU service data unit
SER symbol error rate
SFH slow frequency hopping
SHA secure hashing algorithm
SNR signal to noise ratio
SPA simple power analysis
SSD shared secret data
SSL secure socket layer
UEA UMTS encryption algorithm
UHF ultra high frequency
UIA UMTS integrity algorithm
XOR-Enc XOR encryption
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